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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the pilot episode of the hit television show CSI, Grissom says to Warrick: “Concentrate on what cannot lie. The 
evidence.”1 Although Grissom is a beloved figure in U.S. popular culture, the U.S. is currently unwilling to accept 
that evidence never lies.2 In stark contrast to Grissom's statement, the common law has a long history of allowing 
criminal defendants to cross-examine and question witnesses providing evidence against them. The right to 
confront an accusatory witness is reflected in the historical legal documents of Great Britain,3 in Shakespearean 
writing,4 and even in the Bible.5 In the United States, the right to confront was enshrined in the Sixth Amendment 
to the Federal Constitution which provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”6 The right to confront applies at both the federal level and at 
the state level (through the Fourteenth Amendment).7 
 
Although there is some consensus that the Constitution grants criminal defendants some right to confront their 
accuser, there is much less agreement on exactly who must be confronted and for what kinds of accusations or 
statements.8 Particularly controversial is whether the Confrontation Clause requires a scientific analyst (e.g., from 
the CSI lab) to testify in criminal cases where such an analyst conducts a test, perhaps using a machine or other 
apparatus, and then prepares a report communicating the results of that test, and that report (or evidence of it) is 
offered at trial against an accused.9 
 
 
1. CSI: Crime Scene Investigation Quotes by Gil Grissom, Crimelab.NL http://crime 
lab.nl/quotes.php?series=1&season=99&episode=99&characters=Gil%20Grissom (last visited Mar. 11, 2011).  
2. Or, perhaps, more appropriately, the U.S. is unwilling to accept that those providing testimony never lie. Thus, although Grissom is most 
likely referring to physical evidence, cross-examination can help to control mistaken and false testimonial evidence. It may also lead to 
correcting mistaken interpretations of physical evidence.  
3. See M. Hale, History and Analysis of the Common Law of England 258 (1713) (discussing the examination of witnesses as a means to 
ascertain the truth); 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries 373 (discussing the examination of witnesses as a means to ascertain the truth).  
4. William Shakespeare, Richard II act I, sc. 1; William Shakespeare, Henry VIII, act ii, sc. 1.  
5. Acts 25:16. See generally Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140-41 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring) (acknowledging the historical bases of 
the Confrontation Clause).  
6. U.S. Const. amend. VI.  
7. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).  
8. See infra Part II.  
9. See infra sections II.D-E, Part III.  
4 
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts10 the Supreme Court held that reports from forensic analysts were not 
exempted from the accused's Confrontation Clause protection.11 The prosecution in Melendez-Diaz attempted to 
introduce the analyst's report or affidavit of what he found, alone, without presenting the analyst himself for 
testimony and cross examination.12 The decision held that the analyst of the narcotic substance found on the 
accused had to testify.13 
 
But the Court left open multiple questions, not necessary to the decision on the facts, including whether 
exceptions could be made for certain, specific types of analysts, which specific analyst must testify where several 
were involved, whether someone else from the lab--say a supervisor--could testify instead, and whether an expert 
witness relying on the report could obviate the need for confrontation of the analyst(s).14 Moreover, the continued 
vitality of even the issue purportedly resolved by the Court in Melendez-Diaz (which is widely regarded as a pro-
defense decision) was called into question by the later appointments of Justice Kagan and Justice Sotomayor (who 
has significant experience as a New York city prosecutor)15 to replace Justices who voted with the Court in 
Melendez-Diaz (who did not have significant prosecutorial experience). As a result of all this, as we see it, after 
Melendez-Diaz there were nine important issues16 still left open about how the Confrontation Clause applied to 
the prosecution using reports from forensic experts against a criminal accused at trial. 
 
 
10. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009); see also John Wait, Another "Straightforward Application": The Impact of Melendez-Diaz on Forensic Testing 
and Expert Testimony in Controlled Substances Cases, 33 Campbell L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (2010) ("Taking into consideration each new justice's 
prosecutorial background, the future of Melendez-Diaz is not clear or certain.").  
11. 129 S. Ct. 2527.  
12. See id. at 2531.  
13. See id. at 2542.  
14. The many unresolved issues are discussed in detail below. See infra section IV.A.  
15. Office of the Press Secretary, Background on Judge Sonia Sotomayor, The White House (May 26, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the press office/Background-on-Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).  
16. See infra section IV.A (discussing each of these issues in detail).  
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Just this last term, the Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to tackle one of these issues in a case 
styled Bullcoming v. New Mexico.17 In Bullcoming the Court was specifically asked to determine: “Whether the 
Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic 
analyst through the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did not perform or observe the 
laboratory analysis described in the statements.”18 Melendez-Diaz left that issue untouched, since no attempt was 
made by the prosecution to use an in-court substitute witness for the analyst. The evidence at issue in Melendez-
Diaz was an affidavit or report of the testing analyst.19 
 
Only this somewhat narrow question was presented to the Supreme Court in Bullcoming. But the opportunity was 
there to address many of the other nine issues we have identified. Although prosecutors, crime labs, law 
enforcement officials, defense lawyers, judges, and Evidence and Confrontation Clause scholars would have 
dearly loved--indeed, needed--to see the Court tackle all of these broader issues, there is an argument of judicial 
restraint that counsels against a court taking on issues unnecessary to the particular decision--issues that are not 
specifically raised, briefed, and argued in the case before it--on the grounds that such excursions are likely to be 
poorly thought out.20 
 
It is not the purpose of this Article to weigh in on whether the Bullcoming Court should have tackled these 
broader issues. There are benefits to both views.21 Rather, our purpose is to set out the nine issues regarding 
Confrontation law as applied to scientific reports that arise after Melendez-Diaz, and examine what, if anything, 
the Court said or implied about such issues in Bullcoming. We will also venture some tentative thoughts of our 
own on each of these issues, and some consequences of the various possible views. 
 
 
17. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).  
18. Bullcoming v. New Mexico: Question Presented, Supremecourt.gov, http://www. supremecourt.gov/qp/09-10876qp.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Question Presented].  
19. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009).  
20. See generally Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) ("A 'longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts 
avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.'" (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective 
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988))).  
21. See generally Jack Wade Nowlin, The Judicial Restraint Amendment: Populist Constitutional Reform in the Spirit of the Bill of Rights, 
78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 171 (2002) (discussing the pros and cons of judicial restraint and discussing potential reforms of current judicial 
restraint doctrine).  
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Part II provides some case law history of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence so that the issues may be placed in 
their historical and analytical context. Part III sets forth the facts, the lower court proceedings, and the Supreme 
Court decision, in Bullcoming. Part IV identifies the nine important issues that arose prior to Bullcoming and 
discusses where they stand after that decision. Also considered in that Part are some consequences to law 
enforcement policy. Finally, Part V presents our conclusions. Even though the Supreme Court in Bullcoming 
chose to refrain from laying to rest most of the issues we identify, we hope that this paper will, at least, add to the 
ongoing dialogue on forensics and confrontation rights, and encourage more work in this important and 
developing area of law. 
 
II. MODERN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
Although the right to confront an accuser has a long history, the modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in 
the United States has developed over approximately the last thirty years.22 In this Part, we will detail several 
modern, landmark Confrontation Clause cases in order to provide a necessary background for the remainder of 
this Article. We present the cases generally in chronological order, but will depart once from chronology for 
thematic reasons. The modern Confrontation Clause history begins with the case of Ohio v. Roberts.23 
 
A. Ohio v. Roberts 
 
In Ohio v. Roberts, a suspect was arrested and charged with criminal conduct relating to forgery and having stolen 
a credit card.24 The state attempted to enter a witness's transcript into evidence and the defendant asserted that 
without producing the witness for trial this violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause.25 In determining 
the relationship between the hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause, the Court stated: 
 
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause 
normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears 
adequate “indicia of reliability.” Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence 
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least 
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.26 
 
22. See infra text accompanying notes 24-114.  
23. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  
24. Id. at 58.  
25. Id. at 59.  
26. Id. at 66.  
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The Court, therefore, found that both unavailability and an indication of reliability were required to satisfy the 
Confrontation Clause.27 The Court would later modify its Confrontation Clause analysis in Crawford v. 
Washington.28 
 
B. Crawford v. Washington 
 
In Crawford, the Court rejected its Roberts analysis.29 The Court faced the case of a man, Crawford, charged with 
attempted murder and assault.30 Crawford claimed self-defense, and the state wanted to enter recorded statements 
from the defendant's wife which would help rebut the self-defense claim.31 The wife was not available to testify 
because the wife had marital privilege.32 The trial court applied the Roberts test and admitted the evidence 
because several indicia of reliability existed: the wife was attempting to support her husband's defense not blame 
him; the wife was an eyewitness with direct knowledge of the events; the wife was describing events which were 
still recent; and the wife was questioned by a law enforcement officer who was “neutral.”33 Although the appellate 
court reversed, the Washington Supreme Court also found indicia of reliability, namely that there was a great deal 
of overlap between the wife's testimony and the story recounted by the accused husband.34 The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and rejected the Roberts reliability test.35 
 
 
27. Id.  
28. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  
29. Id. at 60-62.  
30. Id. at 40.  
31. Id.  
32. Id. The court stated that the marital privilege "generally bars a spouse from testifying without the other spouse's consent." Id. (citing 
Wash. Rev. Code § 5.60.060(1) (1994)).  
33. Id.  
34. Id. at 41.  
35. Id. at 60-62.  
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Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia turned to what he understood to be the original understanding of the 
Confrontation Clause.36 Justice Scalia suggested the primary evil that the Confrontation Clause attempts to 
address is the use of ex parte interrogations as evidence against a criminal defendant.37 Justice Scalia argued that 
by using the term “witnesses”38 in the Confrontation Clause, the Clause was meant to target individuals who 
provide some form of testimony: “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or 
proving some fact.”39 Justice Scalia noted that an individual who provides an out-of-court, formal statement to an 
officer gives a form of testimony, but the same individual who makes an out-of-court, casual statement to a friend 
would not necessarily be giving a form of testimony.40 Statements providing testimony (what the Court terms 
testimonial statements)41 are the type of statements which Justice Scalia suggested were intended to be covered by 
the Confrontation Clause.42 
 
Justice Scalia found that the Roberts reliability test was inconsistent with his understanding of the original 
principles of the Confrontation Clause.43 As Justice Scalia stated, the Roberts test: 
 
[D]eparts from the historical principles identified above in two respects. First, it is too broad: It applies 
the same mode of analysis whether or not the hearsay consists of ex parte testimony. This often results in 
close constitutional scrutiny in cases that are far removed from the core concerns of the Clause. At the 
same time, however, the test is too narrow: It admits statements that do consist of ex parte testimony upon 
a mere finding of reliability. This malleable standard often fails to protect against paradigmatic  
 
 
36. See id. at 50-55, 59-60.  
37. Id. at 50. Justice Scalia relied on the English authorities for this proposition. Id. at 50-51.  
38. U.S. Const. amend. VI.  
39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.  
40. Id.  
41. Id.  
42. See id. at 50-55. Justice Scalia based this conclusion on historical and English precedent. Id. Justice Scalia also suggested that this 
understanding of the Confrontation Clause has been reflected in the way in which the Court has actually applied the Clause in past cases: 
"Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the 
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine." Id. at 59.  
43. Id. at 60.  
  
9 
confrontation violations.44 
 
Justice Scalia acknowledged that reliability is one of the goals of the Confrontation Clause, but the Clause grants 
primarily a procedural right to confront.45 Indeed, the Clause does not simply insist that the evidence be reliable, 
but that the reliability of the evidence be specifically tested by cross-examination.46 The Roberts rule, according to 
Justice Scalia, substituted a judge's determination of reliability for the Constitution's prescribed mechanism of 
cross-examination.47 Moreover, Justice Scalia argued that the reliability rule was too unpredictable48 and led to 
courts admitting evidence which clearly violated the intentions of the Confrontation Clause.49 
 
After Crawford, the Confrontation Clause analysis would turn on whether the statement itself was testimonial.50 
The Court did not enumerate all potential classes of testimonial statements but the Court did provide examples of 
what could be testimonial: 
 
 
44. Id. Although Justice Scalia did not provide his own concise definition of everything which could be covered by the term ex parte 
testimony, he clearly used the term to refer to at least the formal, out-of-court statements of one party or witness provided to a police officer 
during questioning and for trial (such as those made by Crawford's wife) without the other party's ability to question the witness. See 
generally id. A general legal definition of ex parte testimony would seem to cover formal testimony by or for one party and in the absence 
of the other party. Black's Law Dictionary defines testimony as "evidence that a competent witness under oath or affirmation gives at trial 
or in an affidavit or deposition." Black's Law Dictionary 703 (2d. Pocket Ed. 2001). Justice Scalia defined testimony as a "solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (citing 2 N. Webster, An 
American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). Ex parte would normally be defined as "done or made at the instance and for the 
benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or argument by, any person adversely interested ... ." Black's Law Dictionary 262 (2d. 
Pocket Ed. 2001). Justice Scalia did provide a nice list of equivalents to ex parte testimony and this helps define the contours of the concept 
as he uses it. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.  
45. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.  
46. Id. at 61.  
47. Id. at 61.  
48. Id. at 63. For instance, Justice Scalia suggested that at least one court used a test consisting of eight factors and allowed the judge to 
weigh them all and attach importance to whichever she chose. Id.  
49. Id. For instance, Justice Scalia suggested that courts were mistakenly admitting accomplice statements to authorities. Id. at 63-64.  
50. Id. at 50-51.  
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ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent--that is, material such as affidavits, custodial 
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial 
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements . . . 
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions; statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial . . . .51 
 
The Court made clear, however, that these were merely examples of testimonial statements: “These formulations 
all share a common nucleus and then define the Clause's coverage at various levels of abstraction around it. 
Regardless of the precise articulation, some statements qualify under any definition--for example, ex parte 
testimony at a preliminary hearing.”52 The Crawford analysis continues to guide the courts,53 but the courts have 
also come to refine what statements are testimonial.54 For example, in Davis v. Washington,55 the Court carved 
out an exception for statements made in connection with an ongoing emergency.56 
 
C. Davis v. Washington 
 
As stated above, Davis established the ongoing emergency exception in Confrontation Clause cases.57 In Davis, 
the court consolidated appeals from two separate state court decisions: the Washington Supreme Court's decision 
in State v. Davis58 and the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Hammon v. State.59 Both cases concerned  
 
 
51. Id. at 51-52 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This exact language was also specifically approved by Justice Scalia 
writing for the Court in Melendez-Diaz. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009).  
52. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. The "common nucleus" would seem to be formal statements, with the government involved, where the 
declarant is aware that the statements can be used for trial purposes. See generally id. Thus, if person X is interrogated by the police after a 
robbery and person X tells the police that person Y stole the jewelry, then the Confrontation Clause protections should apply. If, however, 
the same person X is merely talking casually with a friend and mentions that he knows that person Y stole the jewelry, and a passer-by 
overhears person X's statement, then the Confrontation Clause protections would probably not apply because person X would not anticipate 
the statement's use for trial. However, such a casual remark might have been barred under a Roberts reliability test if it did not seem 
reliable. See id. at 51-52 (discussing how a simple casual remark may be barred under a reliability test).  
53. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).  
54. See infra notes 55-90 and accompanying text.  
55. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).  
56. Id. at 822.  
57. Id.  
58. 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005).  
59. 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).  
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domestic violence.60 In Davis, the State sought to enter into evidence the conversation of a victim with a 911 
operator (made before police arrived on the scene) in order to connect the accused to the crime.61 In Hammon, the 
state sought to enter evidence of an account by the domestic violence victim made after police had arrived on the 
scene and after the perpetrator appeared under control.62 The Court found that statements will not be testimonial if 
they are made during the course of interrogation where the primary purpose of such interrogation is to aid in 
resolving an “ongoing emergency.”63 As the Court said: 
 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances 
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet 
an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.64 
 
Applying this exception to the facts, the Court found that the statements in Davis, made during the 911 call and 
before the officers arrived on the scene, helped resolve an ongoing emergency and were therefore 
nontestimonial.65 By contrast the statements made in Hammon were deemed testimonial because they were made 
to officers already on the scene (when the perpetrator was under control) and were not primarily concerned with 
an ongoing emergency.66 The Court further clarified the distinction between Davis and Hammon, and expounded 
upon the category of cases which are nontestimonial, in Michigan v. Bryant.67 
 
 
60. Davis, 547 U.S. at 818-20.  
61. Id. at 818-19.  
62. Id. at 819-21.  
63. Id. at 822.  
64. Id. (emphasis added). This same passage from Davis was recently cited with approval by the Court. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 
1143, 1154 (2011).  
65. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827-31.  
66. Id.  
67. 131 S. Ct. 1143.  
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D. Michigan v. Bryant 
 
In Bryant, the Court built upon its ongoing emergency concept. Although Bryant is a much more recent case than 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, we will cover Bryant first because Bryant is more closely related to Davis and 
Hammon and Melendez-Diaz is more closely related to Bullcoming (the subject of Part III). 
 
The victim in Bryant was discovered mortally wounded and made statements to the police.68 These statements, 
describing the shooter and the location and time of the shooting, were admitted into evidence against the 
defendant, Richard Bryant, even though the victim was not available and was not cross-examined.69 Bryant was 
convicted by a jury of, among other things, second-degree murder.70 The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to determine whether admission of the victim's statements was barred by the Confrontation Clause.71 
 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court cited Davis and Hammon for the proposition that not all statements in response 
to questions from police officers were necessarily testimonial.72 The Court noted that statements made under 
circumstances suggesting the primary purpose was to assist an ongoing emergency were a form of nontestmonial 
statements made to police officers.73 The Court approved the distinction between the nontestimonial statements in 
Davis (where an ongoing emergency was present) and the testimonial statements in Hammon (where no ongoing 
emergency existed).74 The Court stated that the application of the Confrontation Clause normally turned on 
whether the objective, primary purpose of making or eliciting the statement was for use at trial.75 The Court then 
stated that aiding in ongoing emergencies is one of the most important circumstances suggesting that the primary 
purpose of the statements during the investigation was not to provide trial testimony, but that an ongoing  
 
 
68. Id. at 1150.  
69. Id. at 1150-52.  
70. Id. at 1150.  
71. Id. at 1152.  
72. Id. at 1154-56.  
73. Id.  
74. Id. For a more thorough discussion of the circumstances presented in Davis and Hammon, see supra section II.C.  
75. Id. at 1154-56.  
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emergency was not the only relevant circumstance.76 In making the determination of whether the primary purpose 
is to provide testimony for trial, the Court will objectively evaluate all the circumstances77 and considers multiple 
factors, including: the actions and motivations of the public official and the declarant,78 reliability,79 formality,80 
and whether the statements will resolve the present activity or merely describe a past activity.81 
 
 
76. Id. at 1155-57, 1162-63. Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Court, did not venture much speculation as to what other situations would 
lead to the conclusion that statements made were not the equivalent of trial testimony. Id. If we had to speculate, we would assume that 
Justice Sotomayor wanted to both reserve the possibility of finding future factual circumstances as giving rise to nontestimonial statements 
and reformulate the testimonial or nontestimonial divide into a more general test. What types of statements will now be nontestimonial will 
depend in part on how broadly the Court uses the new indicia factors established in Bryant. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
A very broad reading of the new indicia may mean that a statement could be rendered nontestimonial simply because the investigator was 
not intending to ask the declarant with the motivation for eliciting trial testimony (even if the declarant intended the statement to be 
testimony) or because the declarant did not intend to provide testimony (even though eliciting testimony was the explicit intention of the 
investigator). What is clear is that by framing the ongoing emergency exception as one important circumstance indicating that the primary 
purpose was not to give testimony, the Court seemed to suggest that a good deal more classes of statements may now be found 
nontestimonial.  
77. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156.  
78. Id. at 1160-61.  
79. Id. at 1157-58. Justice Sotomayor's inclusion of reliability is somewhat perplexing. First, it is unclear how reliability bears on the 
statement's purpose. The purpose of the statement and the reliability of the statement seem like two separate considerations. Second, it is 
unclear whether the inclusion of reliability was an attempt to move the Court back toward the standard as set in Roberts. See supra section 
II.A. If the Court wishes to move back toward Roberts, it is unclear why the Court would retain the "testimonial" or "nontestimonial" 
language. Third, and finally, the inclusion of reliability is surprising given how critical the Court was of "reliability" in Crawford. As 
discussed above, the Court criticized the Roberts test based on reliability because the Court believed that the Confrontation Clause granted 
a procedural right to cross-examine rather than a right to credible evidence. See supra section II.B. The Court in Crawford was also 
concerned about use of reliability because the Court felt that a reliability standard was too amorphous and could allow admittance of 
statements which should be excluded by the Confrontation Clause (such as accomplice statements to authorities). Id. In her concurring 
opinion in Bullcoming, Justice Sotomayor suggested reliability was a relevant but not essential component of the Confrontation Clause 
analysis, with the rules of evidence as the primary means of ensuring reliability. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 n.1 
(2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
80. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159-60.  
81. Id. at 1160-61.  
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On the facts of the Bryant case, the Court found that the objective primary purpose was to allow the police to deal 
with an ongoing emergency and the Confrontation Clause did not apply.82 Justice Thomas filed a concurring 
opinion where he reiterated his commitment to deciding Confrontation Clause cases on the basis of the “formality 
and solemnity”83 of the statements (finding such formality lacking in this case) in accordance with the historical 
rationale for the Clause.84 Justices Scalia and Ginsburg both dissented and suggested that it was the intention of 
the declarant, not the investigator, which should be relevant.85 Moreover, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg suggested 
that the Confrontation Clause would still apply to this case whether the objective primary purpose test considered  
 
 
82. Id. at 1167.  
83. Id. at 1167-68 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas made a similar argument in his concurring opinion in Melendez-Diaz. See infra 
section II.E.  
84. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167-68. Justice Thomas disliked the primary purpose test and would instead focus on "the extent to which the 
interrogation resembles those historical practices that the Confrontation Clause addressed." Id. at 1167 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813, 835-836 (2006)). In Davis, Justice Thomas had argued that the primary purpose test was unpredictable in the same way that the 
Roberts reliability test had been unpredictable. Davis, 547 U.S. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The 
Confrontation Clause, according to Justice Thomas, was intended to target practices developed under Queen Mary which employed a 
"civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused." Id. at 835 (citing 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43, 50 (2004); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1992)). In Queen Mary's time, an oral 
examination would be made of the accuser and the accused and the results would be recorded, transmitted to the judge, and sometimes used 
instead of in-court testimony. Id. at 835-36. Justice Thomas argued that in Crawford, the Court recognized that the language of the Clause 
and history would be better reflected by a test which turned on whether the statement was testimonial. Id. at 836. Justice Thomas 
specifically adopted Justice Scalia's definition of "testimony" for the Court in Crawford: "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for 
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Id. However, Justice Thomas suggested that the plain wording of the Court's definition 
of testimony requires "some degree of solemnity before a statement can be deemed testimonial." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Citing to his opinion in White, Justice Thomas contended that the Court's opinions have consistently protected those statements which are 
contained in formalized documents or which have been obtained formally, and have not readily found non-formalized statements to be 
testimonial. Id. at 836-37; White, 502 U.S. at 365. Instead, Justice Thomas suggested that the Court has moved away from a requirement of 
formalization in order to foreclose the possibility of law enforcement easily evading the Confrontation Clause by taking the statements 
informally. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 837-38. While evasion prevention seems important to Justice Thomas, he contends that the primary 
purpose analysis is overly inclusive and that the better approach would be to focus on preventing admission of formal ex parte testimonial 
statements which were historically abused. Id. at 838; White, 502 U.S. at 364-65.  
85. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 1176-77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For Justice Scalia, the declarant's intention is 
vital because in the case of out-of-court statements, it is the intention of the declarant to have his words used to invoke action by the State 
which renders the statement sufficiently formal such that the Confrontation Clause is implicated. Id. at 1168-69. Further, Justice Scalia 
notes that a declarant-based analysis works in all circumstances (because some statements will be volunteered by the declarant and 
unsolicited by officers and so an investigator standard would be inapplicable in such cases). Id. Moreover, Justice Scalia suggested that 
adding in the additional motives of the investigator makes it more difficult to parse "mixed motive" situations (situations where the speaker 
has two or more motives for making the statement) because it adds an additional set of motives to consider (those of the investigator). Id. at 
1170. Finally, Justice Scalia charged that allowing the motives of the investigator to transform the statements of a dying victim (who may 
only be speaking informally and by reflex) into statements of testimony makes no sense. Id. at 1169-70. Justice Ginsburg agreed with 
Justice Scalia on these points. Id. at 1176-77.  
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the motivations of the declarant or the investigators.86 Justice Scalia also accused the Court of creating “an 
expansive exception to the Confrontation Clause for violent crimes.”87 This exception, Justice Scalia suggested, 
will allow emergencies to persist for Confrontation Clause purposes until officers learn of a violent criminal's 
location and his motive for the shooting.88 Justice Scalia argued that this is a dangerous precedent for the Court to 
set because it will allow for the evasion of the Constitutional rights of the accused by empowering investigators to 
gather many statements while the accused is at large and then introduce them at trial without producing the actual 
witnesses for cross-examination.89 
 
Bryant represented the Court's most recent word on the Confrontation Clause prior to Bullcoming. Approximately 
two years before Bryant, the Court handed down its decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. We chose to 
present Melendez-Diaz last because Melendez-Diaz has the most significance for our purposes. Melendez-Diaz 
speaks specifically to the confrontation issues which will also play a background role in the Bullcoming opinion, 
namely to what extent a scientific report should be considered a testimonial statement for the purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause and to what extent a scientific analyst is a witness for Confrontation Clause purposes.90 
 
E. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts 
 
Melendez-Diaz provided the Court with the opportunity to consider the Confrontation Clause in light of forensic 
reports.91 In Melendez-Diaz, the police found four plastic bags which contained a substance--appearing to be 
cocaine--on the person of Thomas Wright.92 The officers submitted the substance to a state laboratory, in 
accordance with Massachusetts law, for chemical analysis.93 Wright was charged with two cocaine-related  
 
 
86. Id. at 1171-72, 1176-77.  
87.Id. at 1173  
88. Id.  
89. Id. Justice Scalia provided a hypothetical to demonstrate why this is a dangerous precedent for the Court to set. Id. The police could 
gather statements about the crime from witnesses while the assailant is still at large or while the motivations for the crime are not yet 
understood. Id. Thereafter, the police officers who heard the statements from the witnesses could testify at trial from their own memory 
without ever producing the original witnesses for cross-examination. Id. Such a broad definition of emergency, which would cover the 
situation where the location and motivation of the accused was not yet known, would thus effectively rob the accused of his Constitutional 
rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id.  
90. See generally Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).  
91. Id. at 2530.  
92. Id.  
93. Id.  
16 
crimes.94 At trial, the prosecution offered into evidence three certificates which showed the results of the chemical 
analysis.95 The certificates reported the weight and size of the bags, as well as the fact that the conducted analysis 
demonstrated the substance contained in the bags to be cocaine.96 As required by Massachusetts law, the 
certificates were also sworn before a public notary.97 The certificates were admitted even though the analysts 
preparing the reports did not testify and Wright was found guilty.98 Wright appealed the conviction, asserting that 
admission of the certificates without the ability to cross-examine the analysts violated his rights under the 
Constitution's Confrontation Clause.99 
 
The Court (Justice Scalia, with Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg) determined that the certificates consisted 
of out-of-court written statements made by individuals not appearing in court100 and were testimonial.101 Justice 
Scalia had “little doubt that the documents at issue in this case fall within the core class of testimonial statements 
thus described [in Crawford].”102 Justice Scalia noted that the Court's description of testimonial statements in 
Crawford mentions affidavits twice and although the state of Massachusetts refers to the statements in the present 
case as certificates, they are clearly affidavits.103 Justice Scalia argued that the statements were sworn and the 
functional equivalent of in-court live testimony.104 Moreover, Justice Scalia stated that not only were the 
statements made under circumstances leading a reasonable person to believe they would be used at trial, but also 
the sole purpose of the affidavits, under Massachusetts law, was for use at trial.105 Justice Scalia concluded that 
the statements were testimonial and that the analyst must be presented for cross-examination, absent a showing of 
unavailability and previous opportunity for cross-examination.106 
 
94. Id.  
95. Id. at 2530-31.  
96. Id. at 2531.  
97. Id.  
98. Id.  
99. Id. The Court's opinion does not make explicitly clear exactly what role each of these analysts played in conducting the tests and 
compiling the certificates.  
100.Id. at 2532, 2542.  
101.Id. at 2532.  
102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
103. Id.  
104. Id. (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).  
105. Id.  
106. Id.  
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Justice Thomas joined the Court's opinion but wrote separately to make clear that he believed that the 
Confrontation Clause only covered statements in “formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”107 Justice Thomas agreed with the Court's opinion in this specific 
case, however, because the statements were contained in documents which were sworn and “quite plainly 
affidavits.”108 
 
Justice Kennedy (along with Justices Roberts, Breyer, and Alito) dissented and criticized the Court for using two 
cases which do not mention scientific evidence, Crawford109 and Davis,110 to “sweep away an accepted rule 
governing the admission of scientific evidence.”111 That long accepted rule, according to Justice Kennedy, was 
that “scientific analysis could be introduced into evidence without testimony from the “analyst” who produced 
it.”112 Justice Kennedy noted that the framers of the Constitution chose to use the word “witnesses” and therefore 
the Court should distinguish between laboratory testing analysts and conventional witnesses.113 What Crawford 
and Davis require, according to the dissent, is that formal statements of conventional witnesses--those with some 
personal knowledge as to the guilt of the defendant--are inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial.114 
 
Following Melendez-Diaz, many issues remained unresolved,115 most notably whether forensic analysts will have  
 
 
107. Id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).  
108. Id. We have provided a more expansive treatment of the rationale of Justice Thomas above. See supra note 83.  
109. See supra section II.B.  
110. See supra section II.C.  
111. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
112. Id.  
113. Id.  
114. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy suggests that a line may be drawn between declarants 
such as those in Davis and Crawford (who had seen or been the victim of the crime) and scientific analysts who had no first-hand 
knowledge of the parties or events in the alleged crime. Id. In some ways, this line is problematic because the analysts will have personal 
knowledge as to the guilt of the accused (for instance, the analysts may be the only ones who knows that the alcohol level of an accused is 
above the legal limit). Moreover, the line will be difficult to draw in cases where an analyst personally comes to the scene to collect 
samples and conducts the test on the samples herself because that would seem to blur the line between personal knowledge and laboratory 
reporting.  
115. We will discuss all the unresolved issues, which the Court should clarify, below. See infra Part IV.  
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to testify in all situations116 and which forensic analyst or analysts in a laboratory will be required to testify.117 
Because the Court in Melendez-Diaz was sharply divided (5-4 with one of the five being a concurrence) and 
because two of the Justices in the Court's Majority opinion were replaced by two new Justices (one of whom has 
significant criminal prosecutorial experience)118 the stage was set for another landmark opinion by the Court. That 
opportunity came along this past term in Bullcoming v. New Mexico.119 In Bullcoming, the Court was asked to 
decide “[w]hether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce testimonial statements of a 
nontestifying forensic analyst through the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did not perform 
or observe the laboratory analysis described in the statements.”120 The Court, if it chose, would have a chance not 
only answer this question, but to reach out and clarify many issues left unresolved by Melendez-Diaz, including 
the specific issues of when an analyst must testify and which analyst must testify. Whether the Court in 
Bullcoming would in fact do so was another matter. 
 
 
116. For instance, it is not entirely clear from the Court's opinion whether a forensic analyst would need to appear if all she did was copy a 
machine print-out. In Melendez-Diaz, both the Court's opinion and the dissenting opinion accept the existence of a traditional exception for 
copyists. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538-39; Id. at 2252-53 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy points out that the certified 
copies of records by clerks (called "copyists") have long been admitted into evidence. Id. at 2252-53. These statements, according to Justice 
Kennedy, seemed testimonial in nature and did require skill and care on the part of the copyists preparing the copies. Id. Justice Kennedy 
suggests that this copyist exception evinces an intention on the part of the Framers to exclude unconventional witnesses (such as copyists 
and forensic analysts) from the Confrontation Clause requirements. Id. Justice Scalia and the Court accept the existence of a copyist 
exception but do not accept Justice Kennedy's analysis of the exception. Id. at 2538-39. Justice Scalia says that the copyist exception was 
"narrowly circumscribed" and covered only the specific case of certifying copies of records in the clerk's office. Id. The copyist exception 
would not seem to cover forensic analysts under Justice Scalia's reading of the exception, nor would it allow for certifications on the part of 
the forensic analyst as to effect or substance. Id. It is possible that some form of middle ground could theoretically exist between the 
Court's opinion and the dissenting opinion which would allow an analyst who was doing nothing more than acting like a copyist to avoid 
the implications of the Confrontation Clause. It seems somewhat doubtful, however, whether Justice Scalia would be willing to extend the 
copyist exception to cover forensic analysts making transcriptions (especially because analysts are normally conducting the actual test and 
making certifications about the test itself). See infra subsection IV.A.2.  
117. There are many cases where forensic testing involves the actions of multiple individuals. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544-
45; see also infra subsection IV.A.4 (performing a toxicology test could involve as many as five individuals, each of whom could 
ostensibly speak to the reliability of the evidence). If the Court requires testimony from forensic analysts, it is not fully clear which of the 
analysts must testify if more than one is involved. Moreover, it is also an open question whether a supervisor at the laboratory may be 
permitted to testify for all the analysts she supervises or works with at the laboratory. See infra subsection IV.A.4.  
118. As mentioned above, Justice Sotomayor is a former New York City prosecutor. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Justice 
Kagan was an academic, government attorney during the Clinton Whitehouse, and Solicitor General. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg et al., A 
Climb Marked By Confidence And Canniness, N.Y. Times (May 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/10/us/politics/10kagan. 
html?pagewanted=1& r=1.  
119.131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).  
120. See Question Presented supra note 18.  
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III. THE BULLCOMING CASE 
 
Bullcoming came to the Court after the case had been decided by the Supreme Court of New Mexico.121 In this 
Part, we will present the factual circumstances in the Bullcoming case. A firm knowledge of the facts will be 
contextually helpful in understanding the issues which the court could have clarified, considered in Part IV. 
 
In Bullcoming, Mr. Bullcoming's vehicle hit Mr. Jackson's vehicle from behind at an intersection.122 When Mr. 
Jackson got out of his vehicle to exchange insurance information with Bullcoming, Mr. Jackson smelled alcohol 
on Bullcoming's breath and noticed that Bullcoming's eyes were bloodshot.123 Mr. Jackson asked his wife to 
phone the police.124 Upon being informed that the police were on the way, Bullcoming left for the bathroom.125 
After arriving on the scene, Officer Marty Snowbarger pursued Bullcoming and noticed him moving rapidly and 
crossing over a bridge nearby.126 
 
Officer Snowbarger finally caught up to Bullcoming and noticed indicia of intoxication (including the smell of 
alcohol, watery and blood-shot eyes, and slurred speech).127 Bullcoming was escorted back to the accident scene 
and another officer, David Rock, also noticed indicia of intoxication-- including blood-shot eyes, the smell of 
alcohol, and a sway while walking.128 Officer Rock asked Bullcoming if he had been drinking.129 Bullcoming 
admitted to having a drink at 6:00 in the morning, but said that he had no alcohol since then.130 After failing a 
series of tests for sobriety, Bullcoming was arrested for Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) and taken to the police 
station.131 Bullcoming refused a breath test and Officer Rock obtained a warrant for performance of a  
 
 
121. See State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010), cert. granted Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010).  
122. Id. at 4.  
123. Id.  
124. Id.  
125. Id.  
126. Id. at 4-5.  
127. Id. at 5.  
128. Id.  
129. Id.  
130. Id.  
131. Id.  
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blood alcohol test.132 Bullcoming's blood alcohol content was 0.21gms/100ml, well above the 0.08gms/100ml 
legally permitted.133 
 
At trial, the prosecution successfully admitted into evidence the Blood Alcohol Report (the Report) from the 
Scientific Laboratory Division, Toxicology Bureau (SLD) of the New Mexico Department of Health as a business 
record (an exception to the hearsay rule).134 The Report contained several certifications135 and chain of custody 
information.136 The Report was signed by multiple individuals: the ‘analyst’ (here, a Mr. Caylor) signed Part B, 
section 2 (certifying that the sample was intact when received, that the laboratory broke the seal, that the  
 
 
 
132. Id.  
133. Id.  
134. Id. at 5-6.  
135. See infra footnotes 136-140 and accompanying text. A full copy of the Blood Alcohol Report appears as part of the Joint Appendix to 
the case. See Joint Appendix at 62-65, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876) [hereinafter Joint Appendix]. 
The first page of the report shows all the original signatures as well as Part A and Part B, which are discussed below. Id. at 62. The chain of 
custody information and procedures are also available from the report. Id. at 62-65.  
136. The chain of custody information is contained in Part A and Part B of the Report. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 6. The chain of custody 
information in Part A consists of identification of the officer who made arrest, identification of the donor, identification of the person who 
drew blood from the donor, and the time, date, and place of the blood withdrawal from the donor. Id. Part A also set out the information the 
officer sought and where the results should be sent. Id. The chain of custody information in Part B consists of a certification of the 
specimen type, how the specimen was received, whether the seal was intact, and whether the procedures set out on page two of Exhibit 1 
were complied with. Id.  
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procedures set out in the report were followed,137 and that the analyst recorded the results);138 a report “reviewer” 
signed Part B, section 3 (certifying that both the analyst and the supervisor of the analyst were qualified to make 
the analysis and that the procedures were followed);139 and an “employee” of the laboratory signed Part B, section 
4 (certifying that the donor had been mailed a legible copy of the laboratory report).140 The analyst, Caylor, who 
conducted Bullcoming's alcohol test, signed Part B, section 2, and prepared the Report, which among other things 
set forth the result of the alcohol test. Caylor did not testify at trial because he was placed on unpaid leave.141  
 
 
137. The standard procedures are set out in the Blood Alcohol Report. See Joint Appendix, supra note 135 at 63-65. The enumerated 
procedures are as follows: 
1. The laboratory named on the front of this report is a laboratory authorized or certified by the Scientific Laboratory Division of the Health 
Department to perform blood and alcohol tests. The agency has established formal procedures for receipt, handling and testing of blood 
samples to assure integrity of the sample, a formal procedure for conduct and report of the chemical analysis of the samples by the gas 
chromatographic method () (specify, if other method used) and quality control procedures to validate the analyses. The quality control 
procedures include semi-annual proficiency testing by an independent agency. The procedures have the general acceptance and approval of 
the scientific community, including the medical profession, and of the courts, as a means of assuring a chemical analysis of a blood sample 
that accurately discloses the concentration of alcohol in the blood. The same procedures are applicable for samples other than blood if 
submitted for alcohol analysis. The analyst who conducts the analysis in this must meet the qualification required by the director of this 
laboratory to properly conduct such analyses. The supervisor of analysts must also be qualified to conduct such analyses. 2. When a blood 
sample is received at the laboratory, the receiving employee examines the sample container and: (a) determines that it is a standard 
container of a kit approved by the director of the laboratory; (b) determines that the container is accompanied by this report, with Part A 
completed; 64(c) determines that the donor's name and the date that the sample was taken have already been entered on this report and on 
the container and that they correspond; (d) makes a log entry of the receipt of the sample and of any irregularity in the condition of the 
container or its seals; (e) places a laboratory number and the date of receipt on the log, on the container, and on this report, so that each has 
the same laboratory number and date of receipt; (f) completes and signs the Certificate of Receiving Employee, making specific notations 
as to any unusual circumstances, discrepancies, or irregularities in the condition or handling of the sample up to the time that the container 
and report are delivered to the analysis laboratory; (g) personally places the container with this report attached in a designated secure 
cabinet for the analyst or delivers it to the analyst. 3. When the blood sample is received by the analyst, the analyst: (a) makes sure the 
laboratory number on the container corresponds with the laboratory number on this report; (b) makes sure the analysis is conducted on the 
sample which accompanied this report at the time the report was received by the analyst; (c) conducts a chemical analysis of the sample 
and enters the results on this report; 65(d) retains the sample container and the raw data from the analysis; (e) completes and signs the 
Certificate of Analyst, noting any circumstance or condition which might affect the integrity of the sample or otherwise affect the validity 
of the analysis; (f) delivers this report to the reviewer. 4. The reviewer checks the calculations of the analysis, examines this report, signs 
the Certificate of Reviewer, and delivers the report to a laboratory employee for distribution. 5. An employee of the agency mails a copy of 
this report to the donor at the address shown on this report, by depositing it in an outgoing mail container which is maintained in the usual 
and ordinary course of business of the laboratory. The employee signs the certificate of mailing to the donor, and mails the original of this 
report to the submitting law enforcement agency. 6. The biological sample will be retained by the testing laboratory for a period of at least 
six (6) months pursuant to regulations of the scientific laboratory division. 
Id.  
138. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 6.  
139. Id.  
140. Id.  
141. Id. The court did not explain why the analyst was on unpaid leave and it is certainly possible that he was placed on unpaid leave due to 
incompetence or even wrongdoing. On the facts, this could be a reason to support the need for cross-examination.  
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Instead, the state offered the testimony of Gerasimos Razatos, another laboratory analyst who played no role in 
the Report's preparation but who helps to oversee the blood alcohol program.142 
 
Razatos testified regarding the Blood Alcohol Content of Bullcoming and the laboratory's standard procedures.143 
Razatos worked at the same laboratory, was a qualified expert witness with respect to the gas chromatograph 
(GC) machines used, and was qualified to testify regarding the specific laboratory procedures employed in the test 
of Bullcoming's blood.144 Razatos testified at trial about the GC machine used to analyze Bullcoming's blood,145 
that any human could look at the GC machine and record the results,146 and that the machine prints out results 
which are then transcribed into the Report.147 Bullcoming objected, under Crawford,148 to the Report's admission 
because the preparing analyst was not present at trial for cross-examination.  
 
 
142. Id. at 5-6.  
143. Id. at 6. Again, the procedures for this specific laboratory are described in the Blood Alcohol Report. See supra note 137.  
144. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 5-6, 9.  
145. Id.  
146. Id. at 6. One way to understand how a GC machine works is to use a ball analogy. See Brief for the NACDL as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 9-11, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876) [hereinafter Brief for the NACDL]. 
Imagine that you are standing at the bottom of a driveway which slopes upward. Id. Imagine that you are blindfolded and that there are 
many sports balls of different kinds at your feet (including wiffle balls, ping pong balls, and one bowling ball). Id. You need to determine 
which one is the bowling ball but you are blindfolded. Id. You do, however, have a leaf blower. Id. In order to determine which one is the 
bowling ball, you use the leaf blower to push the balls up the driveway and the one that does not move is the bowling ball. Id. The GC 
machine does a similar thing except it determines the amount of alcohol in the blood using such "separation science." Id. at 11.  
147. The New Mexico Supreme Court accepted that Razatos was qualified to testify about these issues. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 9. 
However, because Razatos played no role in compiling the Report, one may wonder whether Razatos was actually in a position to know 
whether the specific machine was in good working order, was properly calibrated, and whether the machine was properly operated by the 
analyst. Again, the fact that the specific analyst was placed on unpaid leave may actually suggest incompetence on the part of the analyst. 
Of course, it is certainly possible that Razatos would have been in a position to testify as to the testing analyst's incompetence because 
Razatos worked for the laboratory and helped supervise the blood alcohol program. Id. at 5-6, 9.  
148. Id. The appeal was on the basis of Crawford because the U.S. Supreme Court did not hand down its opinion in Melendez-Diaz until 
the appeal was pending before the New Mexico Supreme Court.  
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Bullcoming asserted that admission of the evidence without the opportunity to cross-examine the preparing 
analyst constituted a violation of Bullcoming's rights under the Confrontation Clause.149 The New Mexico Court 
of Appeals upheld admission of the Report because the court found that forensic reports are nontestimonial.150 
Bullcoming then appealed his conviction to the New Mexico Supreme Court and while his appeal was pending, 
the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Melendez-Diaz.151 The New Mexico Supreme Court accepted 
the case and then applied Justice Thomas's opinion in Melendez-Diaz (as the narrowest holding).152 The court 
acknowledged that the Report was testimonial, notwithstanding that it was not a sworn affidavit like the report in 
Melendez-Diaz.153 However, the New Mexico Supreme Court found that the analyst preparing the report was not 
adding anything new and was a mere scrivener.154 Therefore, because Razatos was qualified to testify as to the  
 
 
149. Id.  
150. Id.  
151. Id. at 7.  
152. See id. at 7-8. This means that in a case such as Melendez-Diaz, where the tie-breaking vote is a concurrence, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court applied the opinion of the concurrence (Justice Thomas) rather than the opinion of the Court (which only had the five 
required votes with Justice Thomas concurring).  
153. Id. at 8. The New Mexico Supreme Court did not find the lack of swearing in this case made the statements nontestimonial because 
the state was attempting to prove a toxicology level in blood in the same way as was done in Melendez-Diaz and Crawford made clear "that 
the absence of oath was not dispositive in determining if a statement is testimonial." Id. (international quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52). More detail about Justice Thomas's opinion in Melendez-Diaz, including his views on formality, is presented 
above. See supra section II.E; see also supra note 83 and accompanying text (evaluating standards of admissibility for documents and 
statements as testimony in light of historical abuse of ex parte testimonial statements).  
154. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 8-10. The derivation of a mere scrivener exception is not fully clear. The New Mexico Supreme Court cites to 
three federal appeals court opinions for the proposition that "raw data" or data generated automatically by machines was either not a 
statement, not testimonial, or that even if it were a testimonial statement, the operator of the machine was not the declarant. See id. at 9 
(citing United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2005)). Although not cited to by the New Mexico Supreme Court, the idea of a 
scrivener exception may also have been inspired by the traditional confrontation exception for copyists discussed by the Court's opinion 
and the dissenting opinion in Melendez-Diaz. See supra note 116. It is possible that the New Mexico Supreme Court read into the copyist 
debate and believed that some common ground existed between Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy in a situation where the analyst was 
doing nothing more than acting like a copyist. Id. The New Mexico Supreme Court may have believed that a mere scrivener fell within the 
narrow copyist exception.  
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workings of a GC machine and the specific laboratory procedures of the testing laboratory preparing the Report, 
and because Mr. Razatos was available to testify at trial, this was sufficient protection for Mr. Bullcoming's 
Confrontation Clause rights.155 The New Mexico Supreme Court did note that the Report contained special chain 
of custody information (going beyond the machine's print-out) but asserted that Melendez-Diaz did not require the 
in court appearance of everyone whose testimony may be relevant to establishing chain of custody.156 
 
As is apparent from the facts, Bullcoming raised issues not specifically covered by Melendez-Diaz, including 
which factual scenarios will trigger the requirement for an analyst to testify, which analyst must testify, and 
whether certain substitute witnesses will suffice. Bullcoming also presented an opportunity for the Court to clarify 
several other issues which remained unresolved in the context of scientific reporting and confrontation. 
 
The United States Supreme Court in Bullcoming issued a 5-4 decision reversing the New Mexico Supreme 
Court.157 The U.S. Supreme Court determined that admission of the report without presentation of the preparing  
 
 
155. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 8-10. As mentioned above, Razatos played no role in the actual compilation of the Report from the analysis. 
See supra note 147 and accompanying text. Thus, it is unclear whether he would be qualified to testify as to the fact that the specific analyst 
conducting the testing actually complied with the procedures or used the machine appropriately. Moreover, it is not clear from the New 
Mexico court's opinion whether there was sufficient interaction between the testing analyst and Razatos, such that Razatos could testify as 
to whether the testing analyst was a good employee and normally conducted thorough tests.  
156.Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 9-10 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 n.1 (2009)). Specifically, the court 
stated: 
We do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the 
sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution's case. While the dissent is correct that 'it is the 
obligation of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody,' post, at 2546, this does not mean that everyone who laid hands on the 
evidence must be called. As stated in the dissent's own quotation,ibid.,from United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244, 250 (C.A.7 1988), 'gaps in 
the chain [of custody] normally go to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.' It is up to the prosecution to decide what 
steps in the chain of custody are so crucial as to require evidence; but what testimony is introduced must (if the defendant objects) be 
introduced live. Additionally, documents prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial 
records. 
Id. We believe that this passage, essentially stating that not every link in the chain of custody must be shown in order to establish chain of 
custody and render evidence admissible, is correct law. But it is beside the point. The question is whether, if the prosecution does choose to 
strengthen the chain of custody proof by addressing a link that it doesn't necessarily have to address, it has to do so with live testimony. In 
Bullcoming, by introducing the certifications about links in the chain of custody which links they did not necessarily have to address, the 
prosecutors chose to address them. The question then is whether prosecutors can do so through certifications without live testimony. The 
principle espoused by the court that not all links need to be proved says nothing on that subject. Strangely, the court seems to say as much 
when it notes, in the above quote, "what testimony is introduced must be introduced live." Id. But the court does not seem to recognize the 
implications of its own statement. We think the court in the footnote in Melendez-Diaz was similarly confused.  
157. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).  
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analyst violated Mr. Bullcoming's rights under the Confrontation Clause, absent unavailability and a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine.158 Justice Ginsburg authored the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Scalia, 
Kagan, Thomas, and Sotomayor.159 However, Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Thomas, did not join the entirety of 
Justice Ginsburg's opinion.160 Moreover, Justice Sotomayor authored a separate concurring opinion to specifically 
emphasize the narrow scope of the Court's majority opinion.161. Although the Court sufficiently disposed of the 
case before it, the Court did not clarify many issues which remain unresolved in the area of forensic reports and 
confrontation rights. 
 
IV. OPEN ISSUES CONCERNING CONFRONTATION AND FORENSIC REPORTS WHEN 
BULLCOMING WAS ACCEPTED FOR DECISION BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
 
Immediately prior to Bullcoming, U.S. Supreme Court precedents left several questions unresolved in the area of 
scientific testing and the Confrontation Clause. The New Mexico Supreme Court compounded the confusion by 
spawning new conceptual debates, such as exempting an analyst from testifying when he merely transcribes 
material from a machine (the mere scrivener concept)162 and allowing one witness to testify on behalf of another 
(the surrogate witness concept).163 
 
In this Part, we identify nine important issues related to the Confrontation Clause which arguably were 
unresolved, or not completely resolved, as Bullcoming arrived on the doorstep of the U.S. Supreme Court. For 
each issue we indicate the extent to which we believe the ultimate decision in Bullcoming addressed the issue, 
provide our own thoughts on the issue, and attempt to present law enforcement concerns. 
 
 
158. See id. at 2714-16.  
159. See id. at 2709.  
160. See id.  
161. See id. at 2719 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
162. See infra subsection IV.A.2.  
163. See infra subsection IV.A.4.  
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A. Issues Needing Resolution as Bullcoming Reached the U.S. Supreme Court 
 
In this section, we will identify the nine issues which we believe the Court could have resolved in its Bullcoming 
opinion. Only one of them was actually resolved by the Court. Even if some of the other issues appear to have 
been addressed by Melendez-Diaz, or were not specifically raised by the facts of Bullcoming, the Court could 
have nevertheless put doubts about such issues to rest by providing more guidance in the Bullcoming opinion. 
Such a single Court opinion--representing the view of the Court as currently constituted--could provide much 
needed guidance to state labs, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges in criminal forensic evidence cases. As 
stated in the introduction, however, we are not saying whether the Court in Bullcoming should have reached out 
and decided these issues---- there are arguments on both sides of the question of how far a Court should go 
beyond the facts of the particular case-- merely that these are issues which need to be resolved by the Court 
sometime soon. We may say a few words about our preferred resolution for some of the issues, but it is more 
important that the Court, at some point, provide clear guidance on these issues and somewhat less important that 
the Court resolve the issues in the way we would prefer. 
 
1. Who is a ‘Witness' for Confrontation Clause Purposes (Or is That Irrelevant)? 
 
Bullcoming was an ideal opportunity for the Court to reaffirm what types of witnesses are contemplated by the 
Confrontation Clause, and clarify what type of witnesses are extraneous to the Confrontation Clause analysis. 
 
Justice Kennedy, in his dissenting opinion in Melendez-Diaz, suggested that only traditional witnesses (those who 
perceived events relevant to the crime, and not scientific analysts) are covered by the Confrontation Clause.164 
This “type of witness” analysis differs from the Court's “type of statement” analysis (that is, which statements are 
testimonial and therefore covered by the Confrontation Clause). Justice Kennedy argued that the Confrontation 
Clause does not refer to testimonial statements, or any class of statements.165 Instead, the Confrontation Clause 
singles out a class of person: “witnesses against” a criminal defendant.166 Justice Kennedy argues that although 
the framers' intent is unclear with regard to who is a qualified witness, it is at least clear that the framers did not 
contemplate that covered witnesses included “an analyst who conducts a scientific test far removed from the 
crime . . . .”167 Justice Kennedy contended that his position is consistent with precedent, as both Crawford and  
 
 
164. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2550 (2009).  
165. Id.  
166.Id. at 2550-51 (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI).  
167. Id. at 2551.  
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Davis involved traditional witnesses (not testing scientists).168 Since Justice Kennedy's dissent raised an argument 
that could possibly have some traction with the new Justices coming to the Court after Melendez-Diaz, it was 
incumbent upon the Court in Bullcoming to set the issue to rest.169 If, however, the Court determined that focusing 
only on the type of statement is appropriate in Confrontation Clause cases, then the Court needed to explicitly 
dismiss the type of witness approach. 
 
In the recent Bryant case, the Court's rhetoric still revolved around statements which were testimonial.170 This 
seemed to suggest the Court would continue to follow a form of statement analysis, rather than a qualified witness 
analysis. The Bryant case did not resolve the issue, however, because Bryant dealt with a traditional witness and 
not a scientific analyst,171 and so the current Court had not spoken explicitly on this issue in the context of 
scientific evidence. 
 
In its Bullcoming opinion, the Court did address the issue of whether form of statement or type of witness should 
govern in forensic report cases. Justice Kennedy in the dissent repeated his argument that the Confrontation 
Clause was not intended to regulate the admission of “impartial lab reports, like the instant one, reports prepared 
by experienced technicians in laboratories that follow professional norms and scientific protocols.”172 However, 
the opinion of the Court specifically rejected the argument that scientific reports were non-adversarial and re-
emphasized the centrality of the Crawford analysis and the classification of statements as testimonial or 
nontestimonial.173 The Court cited Melendez-Diaz as support for the contention that scientific reports available for 
trial are testimonial and that the preparing analyst is a qualified witness for the purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause.174 
 
 
168. Id. at 2543-44 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
169. It is difficult to find a principled distinction between scientific witnesses and traditional witnesses. For example, it is unclear that there 
would be a real distinction between an individual analyst who witnesses the results of a process showing an incriminating fact (such as a 
blood alcohol level which exceeds the legal limit) and a traditional witness who sees an incriminating fact (such as a footprint connecting 
the accused to the scene of the crime).  
170. See supra section II.D.  
171. See supra section II.D.  
172. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
173. Id. at 2716.  
174. Id.  
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Therefore, in our view the Court adequately addressed and resolved this issue in its Bullcoming opinion. The 
Court determined that form of statement analysis would govern the Confrontation Clause in forensic report cases 
rather than type of witness analysis.175 In our view, the Court reached the best result in reaffirming its 
commitment to a “form of statement” analysis. Categorically exempting forensic scientists from the Confrontation 
Clause makes little sense because just as in cases where a traditional witness claims to have seen a license plate or 
the time on a clock, the report of a toxicology machine's results may only be as trustworthy as the person who 
views the machine's results.176 Nor are we convinced that the framers intended to draw a distinction between 
traditional and nontraditional witnesses, and any such distinction is nearly impossible to draw on any principled 
basis.177 
 
2. If Scientific Analysts Must Testify, Should There Be a Scrivener Exception and What Should Count as a 
Scrivener? 
 
When the U.S. Supreme Court took the Bullcoming case, an unresolved issue in the relevant Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence was whether some analysts, who might otherwise be required to testify, would be exempted because 
they were mere scriveners of raw data. 
 
In Bullcoming, the New Mexico Supreme Court suggested that the analyst preparing the report was merely 
transcribing machine issued results and was therefore a mere scrivener.178 Unsurprisingly, the Petitioners in 
Bullcoming suggested that no such scrivener exception exists.179 For some, even the bare act of transcribing a 
number from a machine screen onto paper transforms nontestimonial data into a testimonial assertion.180 Is a 
scientist, working for the state in connection with a case, who merely transcribes the results of a machine, more 
like a person making an accusation or is she merely recording neutral data from a machine? Certainly there is a 
chance of error or mendacity in such transcription. 
 
 
175. Id. at 2713-16.  
176. Brief for Petitioner at 33-35, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].  
177. Justice Kennedy's argument for a distinction between ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses would be helped if he could find, for 
example, a historical case where an expert in horseshoes who identified certain horseshoe tracks could submit his testimony in writing.  
178. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713.  
179. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 33-35.  
180. Respondent's brief discusses this issue. See Brief for Respondent at 18, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876) [hereinafter Brief 
for Respondent].  
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Instead of explicitly addressing the merits of a scrivener exception, the Court side-stepped the issue. The Court 
noted that the analyst in Bullcoming was not a mere scrivener because he made multiple certifications of 
numerous facts beyond merely what the machine provided.181 The Court, without deciding, further noted that the 
existence of a scrivener exception could prove problematic.182 Justice Sotomayor in her concurring opinion 
specifically states that the Court was not faced with, and need not determine, whether the state attempting to 
introduce machine-generated raw data such as a printout from a gas chromatograph (assuming an adequate chain 
of custody is shown), in conjunction with the testimony of a qualified expert witness, was permissible.183 If what 
Justice Sotomayor meant was not the printout itself, but an analyst's report of the printout, her opinion (whose 
vote with the Court was essential in the 5-4 decision), would seem to leave room for a narrow scrivener exception 
in future cases.184 
 
If, as we suspect, the Court intentionally reserved the possibility of finding a scrivener exception applicable in 
future cases, the Court could have provided some further guidance concerning who might qualify as a mere 
scrivener. Presumably, a continuum of types of statements would be established with some being testimonial 
evidence and others being nontestimonial transcriptions. On one side of the continuum (if such a scrivener 
exception were eventually found) might be the situation where an analyst merely records raw data from a machine 
(such as recording the number .21 as a person's blood alcohol content).185 On the opposite side of the continuum 
would be the situation, as in Bullcoming, where the analyst makes multiple signed certifications contained in a 
formalized report.186 However, what about the situations in the middle of the continuum? Would an analyst be a 
scrivener if some de minimus interpretation is required to read the machine, and he provides it in the report, even 
if no other certifications are made? For instance, in Bullcoming, the machine involved is said to provide both a  
 
181. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714-15. The Court stated that Caylor, the preparing analyst, went beyond merely transcribing machine-
generated raw data by including representations regarding human actions and past events. Id. The Court noted Caylor's representations as to 
chain of custody, the performance of a test, that proper protocols were followed, and that no conditions affected the integrity of the analysis 
or the sample. Id.  
182. Id. In making the argument that the scrivener exception is a problematic concept, the Court used the example of a police report which 
presented a purportedly objective fact such as the print-out of a radar gun. Id. The testimony of an officer who was not present at the scene 
to witness the radar gun print-out, but who otherwise was qualified as to the radar gun technology, could not satisfy a defendant's 
confrontation rights by appearing for cross-examination. Id. The Court argues that simply because a forensic report may be more reliable 
than the report of an officer at the scene should not change the Confrontation Clause analysis. Id.  
183. Id. at 2722-23 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). We do not see how this could conceivably present any kind of Confrontation problem 
unless what she means is not the printout itself, but an analyst's report of the printout.  
184. Id.  
185. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 180, at 18. Although Justice Sotomayor chose not to provide great detail on this issue in her 
concurrence, Justice Sotomayor's opinion could be read to permit such an individual to be deemed a scrivener. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2722-23 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
186. See supra footnotes135-40 and accompanying text.  
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number and graphs (which allows the analyst to ensure that the machine tested properly).187 If the analyst merely 
reads and relates in his report the contents and meaning of the graph but makes no certification of anything else, 
should this be enough to make his report more than mere scrivening? How many and which type of assurances on 
the part of an analyst will render the analyst a non-scrivener? The Court at some point should provide clear 
guidance. 
 
We think any scrivener exception is inconsistent with the Court's approach to the Confrontation Clause. A report 
recounting the results of a machine is analytically no different than a report recounting the color of a traffic light. 
Both are fraught with the same kinds of credibility concerns which can be tested by cross examination. Assuming 
both are made with prosecution in mind, they are both testimonial under the logic of the Supreme Court's 
testimonial approach to the Confrontation Clause. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a possibility the Court will, in future cases, evolve a narrow confrontation exception for 
scriveners even though it seems inconsistent with the Court's general testimonial approach. This possibility 
remains because the majority opinion in Bullcoming did not unequivocally rule out a narrow scrivener exception, 
as indicated above.188 Justice Sotomayor, whose vote was indispensible, seems to countenance the possibility of a 
narrow scrivener exception.189 Both the Court's opinion and the dissent in Melendez-Diaz recognized a “copyist's” 
exception,190 which would seem analytically tantamount to a very narrow scrivener exception. A scrivener, then, 
might include an analyst who merely transcribes what a machine has said, although the utility of the exception 
embracing only such a “copyist” would be minimal because in most cases, the machine printout could be brought 
 
 
187. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 35 n.4; see also Brief for the NACDL, supra note 146, at 12 (suggesting that the analyst 
must set the baseline for the machine, that doing so requires comparing the sample to other samples and making adjustments, and that such 
a process "is a wholly subjective task"). Presumably, many such neutral machines require the interpretation of human analysts. If the Court 
accepts that analysts' reports of machine statements are not equivalent to testimony, should interpretations of the analysts be testimonial? If 
so, that may mean that the state could merely introduce reports of exactly what the machine said but not a report which places the number 
or graph into context. Such a narrow scrivener exception, though, would serve very little purpose. It would not normally be needed because 
the prosecution could merely introduce the machine printout. This would not involve a confrontation problem, whether there is a scrivener 
exception or not. In many forensic techniques, the machine printout alone or a report of a machine printout alone, may be useless in court. 
Interpretation may be required. For example, in fingerprints, DNA, and voiceprints, certain things that show up on the visual displays may 
be disregarded by an expert as static or noise or other artifact or anomaly, which would affect the ultimate conclusion of a possible match 
or no match. See generally Brief for the NACDL, supra note 146, at 21-23 (discussing the interpretation process of machine-produced 
results). Should such a judgment by the analyst, expressed in his report, be part of the mere scrivener exception, or should live expert 
testimony be required for the interpretation?  
188. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.  
189. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.  
190. A traditional copyist exception is discussed by both the Court's opinion and the dissent in Melendez-Diaz. See supra note 118.  
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to court instead. Would the scrivener exception encompass a report about bringing a sample to the machine? What 
if an analyst makes additional certifications such as “the machine was working properly,” or interprets in more 
than a de minimis way what the results mean? Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court suggests that these would 
not be mere scriveners.191 
 
3. In Determining Whether an Analyst's Report is Covered by the Confrontation Clause, Should It Matter Whether 
the Statement is Formally Sworn? 
 
Prior to Bullcoming, the importance of formally swearing the statement in determining whether a scientific report 
will be testimonial was murky. As noted previously, Melendez-Diaz was a narrow opinion (5-4) with Justice 
Thomas writing separately and casting the tiebreaking vote.192 Justice Thomas emphasized that he only joined the 
opinion of the Court because Massachusetts required that the scientific report be formally sworn (rendering it 
equivalent to an affidavit).193 In Bryant, the Court re-emphasized the importance of some uncertain degree of 
formality as one of several relevant factors, but again Bryant was not a forensic report case.194 Is being sworn 
relevant to Confrontation Clause analysis, and if so, to what extent? 
 
The Report in Bullcoming was not formally sworn, but was signed and termed a “certification.”195 Some, such as 
the Bullcoming Respondent, suggested that whether a scientific report is testimonial or not turns in part on 
whether the report was formalized and sworn.196 The Bullcoming Respondent noted that in Melendez-Diaz, one of 
the reasons why a majority of the Court found the statements in the reports were testimonial was because the 
statements were formally sworn and were thus functionally affidavits.197 
 
 
191. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.  
192. See supra section II.E.  
193. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009); see also supra section II.E (discussing further Justice Thomas's 
concurrence).  
194. See supra section II.D.  
195. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011).  
196. Brief for Respondent, supra note 180, at 10-16.  
197. Id.  
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A focus on whether the statements in a report are legally sworn holds some public policy attractiveness because it 
would aid legal certainty. Yet there is something perverse about saying sworn statements (which presumably have 
some guarantee of reliability because of the oath and the penalty for perjury that attaches) are more suspect than 
unsworn statements. But perhaps the conundrum is explained by the traditional Anglo-American distrust of 
authority and officially garnered statements,198 or by the supposed greater credibility with which juries view 
sworn statements, although we doubt that juries really do make that distinction. If the law treats sworn reports less 
favorably than unsworn reports, then the state could functionally evade the confrontation rights of a defendant 
simply by instructing its crime laboratories to create only unsworn reports. 
 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico did not seem concerned by the fact that the statement was unsworn and 
accepted that the statement itself was testimonial.199 That position on this issue was seemingly supported by the 
U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Melendez-Diaz (not including Justice Thomas's tie-breaking concurrence).200 
This open debate on the role of formality in scientific reports was a backdrop as the U.S. Supreme Court wrote the 
Bullcoming opinion. 
 
In Bullcoming, the U.S. Supreme Court held that statements contained even in unsworn forensic reports could still 
be testimonial.201 Although Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence noted that formality was not an essential 
component of the determination of whether a statement is testimonial,202 her concurrence and the Court's 
discussion of formality at least suggest formality's continued relevance to the analysis.203 Without endorsing 
specific and exhaustive indicia of formality, the Court suggested that the report in Bullcoming was sufficiently 
formal because the statements were contained in a signed, written report, which was headed “report,”204 and the 
report “contains a legend referring to municipal and magistrate courts' rules that provide for the admission of 
certified blood-alcohol analyses.”205 Thus, although the Court did not provide specific guidance, the Court seemed 
to maintain that some degree of formality would continue to impact the Court's analysis. 
 
 
198. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44-47 (2004). See generally infra text accompanying notes 227-35 (discussing the process 
by which forensic lab reports are created).  
199. State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 8 (N.M. 2010).  
200. See supra section II.E.  
201. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2716-17 (2011).  
202. Id. at 2721 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
203. Id. at 2716-17.  
204. Id. at 2717.  
205. Id.  
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We believe the Court will eventually have to clarify the extent to which formality affects the determination of 
whether a report is testimonial or not, and address more concretely the components of formality. In our view, the 
Court was correct to find that swearing the report is not central to the testimonial analysis. There is little 
difference between a report that is signed by one or more analysts at a laboratory and one which is signed and also 
formally sworn. As long as the analyst compiles results into a formal report, signs the report, and provides the 
report to police officers or prosecutors in connection with an investigation, this is sufficiently formal to be 
equivalent to testimony. The Court did not sufficiently explain what degree of informality could render forensic 
statements nontestimonial. In our view, it would be dispositive if a statement was sufficiently informal. For 
instance, if analyst X merely told analyst Y the results of a test over lunch (or wrote a note to analyst Y of results 
on a paper napkin), these statements should not be sufficiently formal to make them equivalent to out-of-court 
testimony.206 Such statements may be unreliable under the hearsay rules,207 but they should not be unconstitutional 
under the Confrontation Clause. 
 
In sum, the Court in future opinions should provide more guidance as to what degree of formality is required to 
subject the statements of forensic analysts to the Confrontation Clause. 
 
4. If a Scientific Analyst is a Witness for Confrontation Clause Purposes, Which Analyst Must Testify? 
 
Prior to Bullcoming, there was a question as to which, if any, of the forensic analysts involved must appear to 
support a forensic report. The question included (1) whether one analyst (or a supervisor) may testify as a 
surrogate for another; and, if not, (2) which of the sometimes many analysts involved in the report's preparation 
should be made available to testify. 
 
i. The Surrogate Witness Question 
 
Regarding the surrogate witness question, on one hand the Court in Bullcoming could have decided to permit 
surrogate witness testimony provided that certain conditions were met. The Court could have taken note of the 
arguably serious consequences for law enforcement if the specific analyst must necessarily testify.208 If the Court 
had permitted the admission of reports through a surrogate witness, it would also have been desirable to provide  
 
 
206. An alternative approach might be to link the formality factor to the "purpose" factor. Under that view, the degree of formality would 
be a factor to consider in deciding whether the purpose was prosecutorial use.  
207. See generally Fed. R. Evid. 801 through 807.  
208. See infra section IV.B. Respondent asserted that any analyst should be able to testify for another. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 
180, at 56-59.   
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guidance as to who could qualify as a sufficient surrogate and perhaps advise lower courts to instruct the jury, as 
they assign weight to the report, to consider who is and is not providing supporting testimony.209 
 
On the other hand, the Court could have determined that surrogate witness testimony was never sufficient and that 
a defendant has the right to be confronted by the specific analyst involved. The Court in so doing would have 
reinforced the notion that scientific analysis is not neutral data reporting;210 but is instead subject to human 
error,211 report manipulation,212 or the intelligence and training limitations of the specific analyst,213 and these 
must be tested in court. An example of the importance of cross-examining a specific observing witness was 
advanced by Mr. Bullcoming.214 Suppose that X witnesses an altercation and that X assumes that Y started the 
altercation. If X tells his wife about the altercation (including that he believes Y started it), then the wife may 
assume that X witnessed Y starting the fight (rather than merely assuming that Y started it) and the wife may 
testify simply that her husband saw Y start the altercation. Cross-examining the wife in this example could not 
uncover the error in testimony and only cross-examining X could. In Bullcoming, the specific analyst may have 
made mistakes or may not have been diligent215 and Mr. Bullcoming may have wanted to cross-examine the 
specific analyst for that reason. Both Mr. Bullcoming in the Petitioner's Brief216 and Justice Scalia in oral  
 
 
209. For instance, Justice Kennedy said that in the case of chain of custody evidence, normally the potential holes in chain of custody go to 
the weight placed on the admitted evidence. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2547 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
Presumably, other sorts of forensic evidence could be given to the jury and the jury could freely disregard the forensic evidence if not 
supported by the in court testimony of the specific analyst.  
210. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2533-37.  
211. See Brief for the Innocence Network as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) 
(No. 09-10876) ("The fact that a machine is used in the course of forensic analysis does not eliminate the specter of human error.").  
212. For instance, what if mistakes were made, necessary steps skipped, or the analyst deliberately falsified the results? See Brief for 
Petitioner, supra note 176, at 28-29; Brief for the NACDL, supra note 146, at 33 (recounting the story of a police laboratory toxicology lab 
supervisor who falsified certifications concerning an alcohol machine test and others in the laboratory helped cover up the falsification).  
213. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 30. This means that there may be value in interviewing the specific analyst even if the analyst 
has no memory of writing the specific report. Id.  
214. Id. at 21-22.  
215. For instance, the analyst may not have been careful in bringing Bullcoming's blood sample to the machine. The analyst may have 
failed to check if the machine was in good working order or may have misread the results. Alternatively, the analyst may have attempted to 
exhibit care when moving and inputting the sample and when operating the machine, but the analyst may simply not be a very diligent and 
careful person and may have made mistakes.  
216. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 31. The analyst might even have acted in bad faith. For instance, what if the analyst noticed a 
problem with the sample or with the test after he had completed conducting the test? A self-interested analyst may not have wanted to take 
the time to re-run the test and so might have simply signed the assurances on the report to avoid having to retest and waste his time. Cross-
examination could help illuminate such bad faith if bad faith existed.   
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argument217 were concerned with the fact that the analyst in Bullcoming was recently placed on leave without pay 
(because that may be a reflection of the analyst's diligence or skill level). The Court could have determined that 
Mr. Bullcoming had the right to cross-examine the specific analyst for these reasons.218 
 
In its Bullcoming opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court did in fact determine that surrogate witness testimony was 
generally insufficient and that the defendant normally had the right to be confronted with the specific reporting 
analyst.219 In the Court's words: “As a rule, if an out-of-court statement is testimonial in nature, it may not be 
introduced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made the statement is unavailable and the accused 
has had a prior opportunity to confront that witness.”220 Notice, however, that the Court seems to characterize this 
conclusion as a mere general rule, suggesting there may be exceptions. 
 
Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion, necessary for the decision, specifically emphasized that Bullcoming did 
not involve a supervisor who played any role, not even a limited role, in the testing or in the preparation of the 
report.221 If a qualified supervising or reviewing individual who was involved in the testing or report in some 
substantial way was presented to give testimony at trial, Justice Sotomayor suggests the outcome may be 
different: 
 
It would be a different case if, for example, a supervisor who observed an analyst conducting a test 
testified about the results or a report about such results. We need not address what degree of involvement 
is sufficient because here Razatos had no involvement whatsoever in the relevant test and report.222 
 
 
 
217. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876), 2011 WL 719620 
[hereinafter Transcript].  
218. We are not suggesting that this issue should turn upon whether only faulty motives or lack of diligence is apparent from the facts of 
the case. We are simply suggesting that in Bullcoming there are factual reasons to question the analyst's performance level and such 
reasons exemplify why cross-examining the specific analyst may be beneficial to a criminal defendant.  
219. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714-15.  
220. Id. at 2713 (emphasis added).  
221. Id. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
222. Id.  
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Justice Sotomayor's opinion--which represented a necessary vote for the majority, and without which the decision 
would have gone the other way--could be read to allow a limited surrogate witness concept in future cases if a 
certain threshold of qualifications and involvement is demonstrated on the part of the proposed surrogate. In view 
of the majority opinion's allusion to a general rule regarding surrogate witnesses and Justice Sotomayor taking 
pains to point out that the case did not involve anyone who could conceivably qualify as a surrogate witness, we 
believe the Court will eventually adopt a limited surrogacy concept. 
 
ii. The “Which Analyst Must Testify” Question 
 
Because the Court did not, however, adopt any concept of surrogacy, and instead determined that the specific 
analyst must testify, a question arises as to which analyst must appear. 
 
Scientific testing often requires the participation of multiple analysts.223 We conducted an informal interview with 
Dr. Michael William Cleman, Professor of Medicine and Director of the Cardiac Catheterization Laboratory at 
Yale Medical Group, to determine how a typical scientific laboratory involving toxicology analysis operates.224 
Dr. Cleman informed us that a typical toxicology analysis will begin with a first individual (e.g., a physician or 
nurse) extracting blood or collecting a urine sample.225 The collected sample is then sent by the first individual to 
a separate laboratory.226 The sample is then normally received by a second individual at the laboratory and 
checked-in (to ensure chain of custody).227 A third individual will then normally be given the sample for testing.228 
That third individual will conduct the test and then may enter the results into a computer system.229 In some cases 
 
 
223. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2544-45 (2009). The Justices also raised this issue in the Bullcoming oral 
argument. See Transcript, supra note 217, at 9. Justice Kennedy in his Bullcoming dissent emphasized that multiple individuals are 
involved in forensic analysis (in DNA cases it can be as many as forty), and in Bullcoming the opinion of each of the multiple participants 
has independent evidentiary significance. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). As an example of the ambiguity of the 
Court's opinion as to which of the many involved analysts must testify, see Id. Justice Kennedy suggests that the Court's analysis does not 
adequately explain whether each and every one of the many individuals involved in making important certifications must be presented. Id.  
224. Dr. Cleman obtained his M.D. from Johns Hopkins University, completed his residency at the University of Florida-Shands Teaching 
Hospital, and completed his Fellowship at the Yale University School of Medicine. See Telephone Interview with Michael William 
Cleman, Professor of Med. and Dir. of the Cardiac Catheterization Lab., Yale Med. Grp. (Apr. 21, 2011) discussed in E-mail from Michael 
Cleman, MD, to Ronald J. Coleman (July 31, 2011, 2:58 PM) (on file with author).  
225. Id.  
226. Id.  
227. Id.  
228. Id.  
229. Id.  
37 
a fourth individual will be responsible for interpreting the results that the third individual entered into the 
computer and that fourth individual may be the one to create a report of the analysis.230 Meanwhile, the laboratory 
will normally be overseen by a Laboratory Director.231 The Laboratory Director, a fifth individual, will be 
responsible for Quality Assessment (QA), which entails ensuring that the machines are operating properly and 
that the laboratory personnel are functioning appropriately.232 The Director may or may not sign the report, but 
laboratory scientists and medical personnel normally consider the Director (or equivalent supervisor) to be 
responsible for the activities of the laboratory.233 If a typical toxicology test may involve as many as five 
individuals who are all performing tasks requiring skill, attention, and some judgment, then which one of these 
analysts should be required to testify? 
 
If discovering human error or purposive misconduct is the goal for requiring in court testimony of the reporting 
analyst, then it would seem that all of the involved analysts must testify in order to ensure such errors or 
misconduct are discovered.234 However, if all involved analysts were required to appear, a good case could be 
made that scientific testing in court cases may be effectively barred.235 
 
One solution might be for laboratories to simply appoint one person as the in-court representative to testify in all 
cases. But this would require that surrogate witnesses be allowed.236 In smaller laboratories, a single supervisor 
may be able to actually observe or supervise all tests, and such observance may qualify that one supervisor to be a 
satisfactory Confrontation Clause witness for everyone in the laboratory.237 This really is the surrogate witness 
concept, and the two questions (the surrogate witness question and the which of many analysts question) coalesce. 
In larger laboratories, such actual observance will probably not be possible. 
 
 
230. Id.  
231. Id.  
232. Id.  
233. Id.  
234. Assuming, that is, that they each provided an indispensible link in the chain that produced the result contained in the report that is 
offered in evidence to establish that result.  
235. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2545 (2009).  
236.Id. at 2545-46 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006)). Alternatively, it may be allowed by Rule 703 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. See infra subsection IV.A.5.  
237. Professor Richard Friedman, of Michigan Law School, argues that any analyst or supervisor who observes the test may testify to the 
results without a Confrontation Clause issue. Brief for Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9-10, Bullcoming v. 
New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876).   
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In Bullcoming, the Court's opinion merely states (on the which analyst question) that “the analysts who write 
reports that the prosecution introduces must be made available for confrontation . . . .”238 Use of the word 
“analysts” is somewhat ambiguous and could be interpreted to either mean that (1) each of the analysts with 
involvement in the process must testify, or (2) so long as at least one significantly involved witness testifies, that 
will be sufficient to afford defendants their confrontation rights. The use of the phrase “analysts who write” could 
mean the one who puts pen to paper. But, in the quotation, it says he must also be an analyst--i.e., he must be 
involved in the analysis process. But how involved is not specified. 
 
If the court intends option (2), we have difficulty in detecting a substantive difference between that approach and 
a strict conception of surrogate witness testimony. The Court will inevitably have to provide the states and 
laboratories with clearer direction concerning which involved analysts may suffice. 
 
The Court in Bullcoming could have explained whether surrogate testimony would be permitted in any 
circumstances and, if so, under what circumstances. In choosing to adopt specific witness/analyst testimony as the 
general rule, the Court could have provided guidance as to which analyst or how many analysts are required to 
support a given report involving multiple analysts. But on the facts of the case it was unnecessary, as there was 
only one analyst with significant involvement and only this analyst was the subject of the petition to the Court. 
 
As indicated above, the Court in future cases may, and probably will, adopt a limited surrogate witness concept, 
out of considerations of practicality. Although practical considerations should not ordinarily trump a defendant's 
clear constitutional rights, the Court has said repeatedly that the right to confront is a procedural right, not a right 
to reliable evidence.239 Thus, the Confrontation Clause may grant the defendant a right to confront a laboratory 
analyst, but would not necessarily require all analysts who could speak to the reliability of the evidence to appear. 
All that may be required is some substantial basis in cross examination for assessing credibility, not every basis.240 
As long as the defendant can confront one important supervising or observing analyst from the laboratory, who 
has some substantial involvement or knowledge of the important steps used in the test conducted, the Court may 
hold the defendant has been provided with his procedural confrontation rights. The reliability of the underlying 
evidence (that is, the statements in the report itself) should be judged by the rules of evidence and the jury. Thus, 
the Court in future cases may consider adopting a limited version of the surrogate witness concept. 
 
 
238. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715.  
239. See supra section II.B.  
240. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).  
39 
5. In Determining Whether a Separate Analyst Can Testify, What is the Interrelationship Between the Surrogate 
Witness Concept and Federal Rule of Evidence 703 (and Similar State Rules)? 
 
As Bullcoming came to the U.S. Supreme Court, it was unclear whether the Confrontation Clause was an obstacle 
to a familiar use of the Federal Rules of Evidence (widely found also in state rules). Rule 703, on its face, permits 
a qualified expert to testify in opinion form against an accused, based in part on a forensic report of another expert 
who does not testify (even if the testifying expert had nothing to do with the report or the analysis itself).241 But 
does this violate the Confrontation Clause? This question would have been squarely raised by Bullcoming if Mr. 
Razatos had been presented as a qualified expert giving his own opinion on Mr. Bullcoming's blood alcohol level, 
based in part on the report but also on some independent efforts of his own.242 Rule 703 allows an expert to give 
an opinion based on otherwise inadmissible underlying material (such as the report here), if that kind of material 
is found by the judge to be reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in their practice.243 In addition, the Rule 
allows disclosure of that underlying material to the jury if the judge finds that the probative value of disclosure in 
explaining the basis of the expert's opinion outweighs its prejudicial effect (the tendency of the jury to credit the 
truth of the underlying material).244 Thus, there are two issues at work here: one is the opinion itself and the other 
is the disclosure of the opinion's underlying basis. The issue of most interest for our present purposes is the 
disclosure of the underlying basis, because the independent opinion of the expert itself is probably (though not  
 
 
240. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).  
241. Of course, Rule 703 also applies in the civil context and in the criminal context when the evidence is not being used against a criminal 
defendant. These contexts would present no Constitutional Confrontation problem. See generally Fed. R. Evid. 101 (stating essentially that 
the Federal Rules of Evidence govern all proceedings in United States Federal court, unless the Rules provide an exception to the contrary).  
242. For his testimony to have been presented this way under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Razatos would have had to meet certain 
qualifications as an expert, and his testimony would need to have been soundly based on sufficient and reliable information, only part of 
which could be the report done by the analyst in question in Bullcoming. If an "expert witness" is a mere conduit for someone else's 
opinion or findings, with no independent input, the testimony is inadmissible under the Rules. See Fed. R. Evid 702; Brooks v. People, 975 
P.2d 1105, 1109 (Colo. 1999). On the facts of the case it is doubtful that Mr. Razatos ever could have satisfied these evidentiary 
requirements. If the expert's testimony is based on reading the actual printout of the machine, there is likely no confrontation problem, at 
least as to the printout being considered testimonial. It seems that a machine statement cannot be considered testimonial. There could be, at 
least theoretically, confrontation problems if his testimony is also based on other human certifications which could be considered 
testimonial (e.g., that the substance brought to the machine was from Bullcoming, that the machine was properly calibrated, etc.).  
243. Fed. R. Evid. 703.  
244. See generally id.; Paul F. Rothstein, Federal Rules of Evidence 522-38 (3d ed. 2011). If the underlying material is let into evidence, 
the judge is to instruct the jury not to take the underlying material for its truth, but just to use it to explain the basis of the expert's 
testimony. Id. It is questionable whether the Supreme Court would accept that this feat could be done by the jury. Whether the Court does 
may be critical to whether the Confrontation Clause applies. It is an undetermined question whether the Confrontation Clause applies only 
to statements offered for their truth, but there is some reason to believe that is the case. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 
(2004) ("The Clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted." 
(citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985))).  
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inevitably) sufficiently supported for confrontation clause purposes by the expert being on the witness stand.245 
The question, then, is whether an expert testifying for the prosecution as to his opinion, can introduce in support 
of his opinion, actual statements from forensic reports he relied on, which statements would otherwise be 
prohibited by the Confrontation Clause because the reporting analyst does not testify. In other words, can the 
expert witness (or more properly, can the prosecution in connection with the expert's testimony) constitutionally 
use the gateway provided by Rule 703 and similar state rules, that allows underlying basis disclosure in the case 
of an “independent” testifying expert who played no role in preparing the report or making the test. This is 
different than the surrogate witness concept because the expert witness may or may not have had anything 
whatever to do with the underlying analysis or report.  
 
Even if the expert was a supervisor, admitting evidence supported by the testimony of a supervising analyst as an 
independent expert is distinct from admitting the same evidence supported by the testimony of a supervising 
analyst as surrogate witness.246 The former requires not only certain expert qualifications on the part of witnesses, 
but also requires that they make an independent judgment based on more than merely the report. The latter may 
not require any of that, but requires some involvement with the report or the test itself. 
 
In Bullcoming, the Court chose not to resolve the Rule 703 issues. Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence noted 
that the case did not implicate a Rule 703 analysis because the state was attempting to introduce the report itself 
rather than opinion testimony of an expert that may have included discussion of the report.247  
 
 
245. If for some reason the state's version of Rule 703 were interpreted by the state to allow an expert to base his opinion exclusively on the 
report of another who does not testify, it is clear from what has been said of Bullcoming above, that this would violate the Confrontation 
Clause. See supra subsections IV.A.4-5. A more subtle question would be whether the Confrontation Clause would be violated if the report 
were not the exclusive basis for the expert's opinion, but still an indispensible part of the basis (without which the expert would have the 
opposite opinion or be unable to give his opinion). We think the clause would not be violated if the other requirements were met. For 
example, cross examination of the expert could adequately alert the jury to possibilities of infirmity in this situation. But Bullcoming has 
nothing to say on this. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in Bullcoming, however, may have an implication that it might be all right. See 
infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text. In a pair of recent decisions, one of them based on Justice Sotomayor's concurrence, this was 
held to be all right. See People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 275 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) (No. 10-8505); State v. 
Roach, No. 06-03-0342, 2011 WL 3241467 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 1, 2011). Williams is discussed infra notes 249-57 and 
accompanying text.  
246. Brief for the States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-
10876) [hereinafter Brief for the States].  
247. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2723 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
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According to Justice Sotomayor, the witness testifying was attempting to support the report rather than enter his 
independent professional judgment.248 She thus left open the questions presented here concerning expert 
testimony and Rule 703. 
 
In this connection, the facts of a recent Illinois Supreme Court case, People v. Williams,249 which considered Rule 
703 in a forensic analysis situation, are instructive. In Williams, the defendant was charged with, among other 
things, criminal sexual assault.250 At trial, a police analyst testified to a likely DNA match between defendant and 
the DNA deposited on the victim.251 This testifying police analyst expressly relied in part upon her own 
analysis252 and in part upon a DNA report compiled by a different analyst at a private lab253 who did not testify.254 
The testifying police analyst was also allowed to disclose the results of that private lab analysis.255 The Illinois 
Supreme Court upheld all of the police analyst's testimony,256 and the case is now before the U.S. Supreme 
Court.257 
 
248. See id. at 2722. Justice Sotomayor added that Bullcoming: 
 
Is not a case in which an expert witness was asked for his independent opinion about underlying testimonial reports that were not 
themselves admitted into evidence... . We would face a different question if asked to determine the constitutionality of allowing an expert 
witness to discuss others' testimonial statements if the testimonial statements were not themselves admitted as evidence. 
Id. (citations omitted). She thus is a bit ambiguous about whether she is addressing the opinion itself, disclosure of the underlying basis, or 
both. In addition, she suggests there is a difference between allowing the expert witness to "discuss" others' testimonial statements (i.e., 
statements in the report), "discussion" which she suggests might constitute permissible disclosure, and "admitting them into evidence" in 
connection with the expert's testimony, which she suggests would not be permissible disclosure. Id. In our view, both a "discussion" and 
"admittance" of the statements in support of expert testimony can be functionally equivalent. The real question should be the extent to 
which the substance and contents of the statements are transferred to the jury and what kind of role the statements are allowed to play with 
the jury - regardless of whether the statements are merely "discussed" by the expert or "admitted into evidence" in connection with his 
testimony. If the distinction is, as Justice Sotomayor suggests, between "discussion" of the statements and formal admission of them into 
evidence, then we have placed form over substance. Under this distinction the prosecution, instead of seeking to "admit" the statements into 
evidence in connection with the expert testimony, could have the expert discuss them quite thoroughly - getting their substance into 
evidence just the same, but without the constitutional trouble.  
249. 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010).  
250. Id. at 269.  
251. Id.  
252. She tested the defendant's blood and derived a DNA profile. Id. at 271.  
253. This lab tested the DNA left on the victim. Id. The testifying police analyst also reviewed this private lab's work, and did the 
comparison of the two DNA samples, concluding there was a match. Id. at 271.  
254. Id. at 270-72.  
255. Id. at 284.  
256. Id. at 287.  
257.Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) (No. 10-8505).  
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In cases such as this, the U.S. Supreme Court could find that Rule 703 empowers one analyst to testify for the 
prosecution and to disclose the findings of a forensic test done by another--that the testifying analyst played no 
role in compiling258--so long as the appearing analyst is an independently qualified expert making a sufficiently 
independent judgment. In other words, the Court could take the approach of the Illinois Supreme Court in 
Williams. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Williams will be the next big decision in the unfolding story of forensic 
reports and the Confrontation Clause, perhaps answering the expert witness questions left open by Bullcoming. 
Taking its cue from Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in Bullcoming --which, after all, was the swing or 
controlling vote--the Court may well rule that as long as the witness is not merely parroting the conclusions of the 
previous analyst, a qualified expert witness can testify to her own sufficiently independently based opinion 
without violating Confrontation rights, even if part of that basis is the previous analyst's report. The Court may 
further find, in accord with Justice Sotomayor's implications,259 that some limited disclosure of the report itself in 
connection with such an expert's testimony may also be permissible, if necessary to support the expert's opinion. 
The court may also require that jurors be adequately instructed in some comprehensible way that the report 
material itself can play only a limited role in their deliberations and should be heard with caution. It may be that 
the instruction, for confrontation purposes, will need to caution the jury not to use the report statements for their 
truth, although we do not believe this untenable distinction (between taking material “for its truth” and taking it as 
“explanation of the expert's opinion”) made by Rule 703 jurisprudence should be embraced by Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence, at least in this connection. In essence, we are predicting that the U.S. Supreme Court will 
substantially affirm most of the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in Williams.260 
 
The mere fact that a jurisdiction's interpretation of Rule 703--or even Rule 703 itself--would allow the evidence 
should be extraneous to the Confrontation Clause analysis. The Court will make its own independent 
determination for Confrontation Clause purposes, as to whether the above parameters are met. The Court has 
previously stated that whether the Confrontation Clause applies does not hinge on the contours of the rules of 
 
 
258. An argument to this effect is advanced by the Amicus Brief of the States. Brief for the States, supra note 246, at 12.  
259. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.  
260. We are predicting, from the Sotomayor concurrence in Bullcoming, that Justice Sotomayor will join with the four dissenters in 
Bullcoming, to find no confrontation violation in Williams, though she will not join in their reasons. In a case remarkably similar to 
Williams, one state court decision has already found there was no confrontation violation because, based on Justice Sotomayor's 
concurrence in Bullcoming, the court believed that is how the U.S. Supreme Court would rule. See State v. Roach, No.06-03-0342, 2011 
WL 3241467 at 4-5 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Aug. 1, 2011); see also Rector v. State, 681 S.E.2d 157, 160 (Ga. 2009) (finding that testimony 
of toxicologist agreeing with results from report prepared by doctor did not violate the confrontation clause). But see State v. Aragon. 225 
P. 3d 1280, 1283-91 (N.M. 2010).   
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evidence.261 It would indeed be strange to allow a rule of evidence to render admissible, evidence that the 
Constitution would otherwise prohibit. 
 
If the Court does go down the road we think it will, it will need to define, for Confrontation Clause purposes, the 
nature and quantum of independent judgment and independent basis which is required to permit testimony of an 
expert predicated in part upon the forensic report compiled by another analyst. Further, the Court will eventually 
have to clarify exactly what is required to permit mentioning or introducing the content of the report itself in 
connection with such opinion, how extensive that mention can be in various situations, and how its reception can 
be properly limited in instructions to the jury. 
 
In other words, the Court will need to inform lower courts and the other players in the process, as to what it 
believes are the constitutional uses of Rule 703 against the accused in the scientific reporting context. This should 
clarify the relationship amongst Rule 703, the surrogate witness concept, and the Confrontation Clause. 
 
6. Should the Defense's Own Right to Call the Specific Analyst to the Stand Be Sufficient, With No Need for the 
Prosecution to Present the Analyst? 
 
Another question that could have been more effectively laid to rest in Bullcoming is whether defendant's right to 
subpoena the specific analyst satisfies his confrontation rights. Both the majority and the dissenting opinion in 
Melendez-Diaz discuss the inter-relationship between the confrontation rights of the defendant and his ability to 
subpoena a scientific witness.262 The Court's opinion in Bullcoming suggested the defense's ability to subpoena 
was irrelevant to the analysis.263 Justice Kennedy in the Melendez-Diaz dissent supported his position that the 
analyst need not be presented, by noting that “if, in an extraordinary case, the particular analyst's testimony is 
necessary to the defense, then, of course, the defendant may subpoena the analyst.”264 Justice Kennedy made a 
similar assertion in support of his contention that the analyst need not be presented in his dissenting opinion in 
Bullcoming.265 
 
 
261. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 14, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004)) [hereinafter Reply Brief for Petitioner].  
262.Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540; Id. at 2547 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). It is the Compulsory Process Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution that gives the criminal defendant the right to summon and present evidence and witnesses in his own defense. See 
U.S. Const. amend. VI.  
263. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2719 n.9.  
264. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2547.  
265. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2728 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
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It does seem somewhat plausible that if the defendant is actually concerned with human error or the misconduct 
of the specific testing analyst, then the defense could simply subpoena the analyst or another to impeach the 
credibility of the test report. In many cases today, the defense may not genuinely question the accuracy of the 
report but may still seek to exclude it based on a Confrontation Clause right.266 
 
The Court in Bullcoming, in accord with these considerations, could have adopted a rule that in forensic report 
cases, the ability of the defense to subpoena the specific analyst (if the defense wants to cross-examine him for 
some reason) obviates the need for the specific analyst to always be presented for in-court testimony by the 
prosecution in order to admit the report. Alternatively, the Court could have explicitly reaffirmed the position that 
the defendant's ability to subpoena the specific witness is wholly irrelevant because of the clear mandate of the 
Confrontation Clause, that the defendant is to be confronted with the witnesses against him.267 Justice Scalia in 
Melendez-Diaz stated that the right to subpoena a witness is not a substitute for the right to cross-examine under 
the Confrontation Clause.268 Justice Scalia's statement is supported by the Court's act of sending Briscoe v. 
Virginia269 back to the lower court for application of Melendez-Diaz.270 The Justices' questions in the Bullcoming 
oral argument also alluded to the irrelevance of the ability to subpoena.271 But, unfortunately, Justice Ginsberg's 
reaffirmation of the irrelevance of the defendant's right to subpoena the specific witness, is in the portion of the 
Bullcoming opinion which was not joined by a majority of the Court.272 Although it may continue to be inferred 
that the ability to subpoena is no substitute for the right to confront the specific preparing analyst, the Court could 
have made this more explicit. 
 
 
266. Justice Kennedy also raises this issue in his Melendez-Diaz dissent. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2549 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
267. See U.S. Const. amend. VI.  
268. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
269. 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2009).  
270. Briscoe presented the question of whether, if the state pays for it, the defendant's right to summon the analyst to the stand would 
obviate the need for the state to present the analyst in court as a witness, and would allow the state to present the analyst's report instead. 
See generally Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113, 117-18 (Va. 2008). The state's payment could have been a reason which 
distinguished the case from the holding in Melendez-Diaz that the defendant's right to subpoena did not obviate his right to be presented 
with the witness. But apparently the Court did not feel this was a significant distinction when it remanded Briscoe. By sending Briscoe 
back to the lower court, the Supreme Court was effectively stating that Melendez-Diaz could already act as authority for the proposition 
that a defendant's ability to subpoena does not satisfy the Confrontation Clause, whether the state pays or not.  
271. Transcript supra note 217, at 5.  
272. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2718-19.  
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In the future, the Court will probably reaffirm that the defendant's ability to subpoena is largely irrelevant to the 
confrontation question (even if the state bears the cost of finding and subpoenaing the witness for the defendant). 
The Confrontation Clause restricts the ability of the prosecution to enter evidence without providing the defendant 
her procedural right to confront the accuser providing such evidence.273 The prosecution is therefore allocated the 
cost of finding the witness and cannot enter the evidence if the witness is deceased or unavailable. If the Court 
stated that the defendants' ability to subpoena the witness was sufficient to meet the Confrontation Clause, the 
Court would be shifting the burden of finding the witness (and the risk of the witness's unavailability) to 
defendants274 and would be denying them their right to be confronted with the witness. If the ability to subpoena 
satisfied the right to confront, there would be little need for the prosecution to present any witnesses live, not just 
analysts (unless those witnesses provided some tactical benefit to the prosecution). In such a system, the 
prosecution could enter written statements it gathered, such as eyewitnesses to a murder, and the murder 
defendant could simply subpoena the witnesses if the defense believed that the evidence was defective. Such a 
subpoena-based system is far from our present system of trial, and the Court, in our view, will not countenance 
this. 
 
The Court could, however, adopt a more limited rule, allowing defendants' subpoena ability to play a more limited 
role in confrontation analysis. For example, the court could adopt a subpoena ability analysis only in certain 
situations, such as cases of expert or scientific reports. However, based on the above discussion,275 it is unlikely 
the Court would allow the ability to subpoena to totally obviate the obligation of the prosecution to present the 
analyst in such cases. But defendants' subpoena ability may be one of the reasons the Court would adopt a 
surrogate witness and/or expert witness approach to easing the confrontation requirement in the case of scientific 
reports.276 The ability to subpoena the basic analysts is precisely what would soften any harm associated with the 
Court's adoption of a surrogate witness or expert witness “exception” to the need to confront the basic analysts. It 
may also be a reason not to require all analysts who had anything to do with a report to be presented by the 
prosecution.277 In each of these instances, the Court may feel that cross-examination of the person who is  
 
 
273. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
274. Although it is conceivable to limit the rule that a defendant's ability to subpoena suffices by saying that it suffices only if the witness is 
available for the defendant to subpoena - i.e., not dead or beyond reach - and the prosecution pays all expenses in connection with the 
defendant finding and presenting the witness.  
275. See supra notes 262-74 and accompanying text.  
276. For the surrogate witness notion, see supra subsection IV.A.4. For the expert witness notion, see supra subsection IV.A.5.  
277. See supra subsection IV.A.4.  
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presented, when combined with the right of the defendant to subpoena any others, may, in combination, 
sufficiently protect the rights of the defendant.278 
 
Thus, in future cases, the Court may hold that defendants do not always have a constitutional right to confront 
every single one of the analysts involved in reports, because defendants can still use their ability to subpoena in 
order to cross-examine analysts whom they fear may have made mistakes in scientific analysis. 
 
7. Should There Be Some Practical Time Limitation on the Requirement that the Analyst Appear? 
 
Prior to Bullcoming, an open question was whether there could be any practical time limit on any duty of an 
analyst to appear in forensics cases. Bullcoming did nothing to clarify the matter. 
 
Criminal investigations and prosecutions can move extremely slowly. Imagine, for example, that Colonel Mustard 
kills Miss Scarlet in the Conservatory. Professor Plum is investigating the murder of Miss Scarlet and has Miss 
Scarlet's body shipped to an autopsy facility to determine the cause of death. An employee of the facility performs 
the autopsy and determines that Miss Scarlet was struck in the head with a lead pipe causing her death. Professor 
Plum knows that Colonel Mustard was in possession of a lead pipe and wants to enter the report of the autopsy 
employee into evidence at Colonel Mustard's trial. Unfortunately, the court system in the state of Clue is slow and 
so it takes time for Colonel Mustard's trial to commence. In the meantime, the employee of the testing facility dies 
in a car accident. Assume that the body of Miss Scarlet has deteriorated by now so that re-testing to determine if a 
lead pipe caused her death is not possible. If, following Bullcoming, the autopsy report is testimonial, and if only 
the specific employee preparing the autopsy report will satisfy the Confrontation Clause, then the autopsy report 
cannot be used to prosecute Colonel Mustard. In this way, Colonel Mustard will quite literally get away with 
murder. At least one author has asserted that “excluding the autopsy report where a medical examiner dies 
[sometimes] effectively functions as a statute of limitations for murder . . . .”279 If the Constitution effectively 
imposes a statute of limitations for crimes which otherwise have no statute of limitations, the Court may want to 
rethink the implications of Bullcoming in a case where time has caused this problem. The Court's opinion in 
Bullcoming made no attempt to address practical time limitations on the requirement of the specific witness to 
testify280 even though the lack of such limitations could prove extremely problematic. 
 
 
278. Alternative or additional safeguards might be the right to argue to the jury that there are potential infirmities if participants are not 
presented by the prosecution; and an instruction by the judge to the jurors, alerting jurors to such potential infirmities.  
279. Carolyn Zabrycki, Comment, Toward A Definition of "Testimonial": How Autopsy Reports Do Not Embody the Qualities of a 
Testimonial Statement, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 1093, 1115 (2008).  
280. See generally Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).  
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If surrogate witness testimony is ultimately allowed,281 this problem would be diminished. When one examiner 
died, another examiner working in the same laboratory and involved in the process could (assuming he qualified 
for the surrogacy role) testify in the deceased examiner's place. Similarly, allowing expert testimony based on 
and/or supported by statements from the report as discussed above,282 could also diminish the problem. Another 
less rational solution might be merely to impose a time limit. After a certain period of time, if the analyst became 
unavailable for a legitimate reason, the duty to produce him would expire. 
 
8. Would the Analyst Have to Testify (If at All) Only When the Testing/Reporting is Done for Purposes of a Legal 
Proceeding? 
 
As Bullcoming was moving through the courts, it was an open question whether the Confrontation Clause is only 
implicated if the forensic testing or reporting was done with prosecution specifically in mind.283 Of course, this 
question did not present itself in Bullcoming because the test and report in Bullcoming were obviously done with 
prosecution in mind. 
 
In both Bryant and Davis, discussed above, the Court said that if a statement was not made with the objective, 
primary purpose to be used at trial as a substitute for testimony, then the statement could be admitted without 
violating the Confrontation Clause rights of the defendant.284 Should that mean that objective statements in a 
report by scientific analysts which are primarily made for purposes other than legal proceedings do not implicate 
the Confrontation Clause? Are there any scientific reports that might be used at a criminal trial against a defendant 
that could be said to have been made for other purposes? The answer is likely yes, but few (and not normally 
forensic reports, almost by definition). For example, there may be scientific studies done by a University medical 
school well before any specific case has arisen, about the nature of a particular mental illness, which might 
become relevant for the prosecution in a subsequently arising case involving the insanity defense. In practice, 
however, most forensic reports are clearly compiled with trial in mind (for instance testing for DNA, drugs, 
alcohol, or skin under the fingernails). 
 
 
281. See supra subsection IV.A.4.  
282. See supra subsection IV.A.5.  
283. Finer distinctions could of course be drawn. For example, is it the purpose of the test or the report that is significant? Are all legal 
purposes alike, or should we distinguish among purposes of investigation, prosecution, trial, civil, and criminal proceedings? What if there 
are multiple purposes, some non-legal? What if the test and report were done for another legal proceeding, or one of a different nature than 
the one in which it is offered? These are distinctions that could be drawn in cases like Davis and Bryant, as well as the scientific evidence 
cases we are considering. There is virtually no elucidation of them in the case law.  
284. Sections II.C-D.  
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Nevertheless, because there are instances like the University medical school example and others, the question here 
is a real one. In light of the primary purpose formulation in Bryant and Davis, the Court will eventually need to 
clarify the extent to which some tests, studies, or reports may be seen as not having been done for 
legal/prosecutorial purposes (and therefore perhaps evade the Confrontation Clause), though the Court did not 
address this issue--and did not need to--in Bullcoming. In Bullcoming, the Court simply reaffirmed its position in 
Melendez-Diaz: “An analyst's certification prepared in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution . . . 
is testimonial, and therefore within the compass of the Confrontation Clause.”285 Subsequently, in footnote six of 
the opinion, which was not joined by Justice Thomas and therefore does not represent a majority of the Court, 
Justice Ginsburg cited Melendez-Diaz for the proposition that business and public records would be admissible 
without confrontation because such records were prepared without the primary purpose of proving or establishing 
facts at trial and were instead primarily concerned with “administration of [the] entity's affairs . . . .”286 Justice 
Sotomayor's concurrence suggested that where the primary purpose of creating the report was medical treatment 
or diagnosis, the report could potentially be admissible absent confrontation.287 Thus, although the Court's opinion 
in Bullcoming did not officially endorse a specific set of purposes which could remove forensic reports from 
Confrontation Clause protection, the opinions of several of the Justices who constituted the majority strongly 
implied that several such alternative purposes existed. 
 
The Court in Bullcoming could have better explained the extent to which a reporting analyst need not testify if the 
test and report are done without trial in mind. The Court's opinion could have, first, given a clear pronouncement 
on the issue, and then, second, provided guidance as to how to determine whether a given report requires 
confrontation based on purpose. The Court's opinion could have enumerated a non-exhaustive list of purposes 
which might fall outside Confrontation Clause protection, discussed the extent to which a mixed motivation of 
medical diagnosis and trial could require confrontation, and suggested the degree of weight to be accorded the 
subjective intention and belief of the analyst creating the report at the time of creation. But the Court chose not to 
do so, and these matters will have to be clarified by later decisions. 
 
 
285.Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713-14 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 
S. Ct. 2527, 2537-40 (2009)).  
286. Id. at 2714 n.6 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539-40). This, of course, assumes that the records were made for such neutral 
purposes, which is not inevitably so. It is not even clear that the hearsay exceptions for business and public records always requires such 
neutral purposes, as was recognized by Justice Scalia. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1174-75 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
287. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
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The likely result will ultimately be that, based on Davis and Bryant, the Court will find that at least where there 
was no legal motivation for the report or any link in the process it reports, the evidence is nontestimonial. For 
example, it seems likely that if a test were conducted for the primary purposes of diagnosing a patient for 
treatment purposes and a report of the test were compiled for that purpose, even if the doctor knew or could 
foresee that such a report could potentially be used at trial, the statements contained in the report would be 
nontestimonial. Focusing on whether the parties primarily intended the statements to be used as testimony seems 
consistent with the Court's primary purpose analysis as most recently formulated in Bryant.288 
 
9. Should It Matter Whether the Laboratory is Public or Private? 
 
An open question not answered by Crawford, Davis, Bryant, or any other case, is whether a statement can be 
testimonial if there is no state involvement in the making or receiving of the statement? In Crawford, Davis, and 
Bryant, the statements, made by citizens, were obtained by police.289 In Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming (the 
forensic report cases), the statements were made by official agents of the state, but also to police and 
prosecutors.290 
 
 
288. See supra section II.D. Although the reliability portion of the Bryant test may be dubious, we agree with the Court that the intention of 
the person making the statement is an important factor in determining whether the statement is testimonial or not. Id. Asking whether a 
report was prepared with prosecutorial use in mind may be painting with too broad a brush. Suppose a state crime lab routinely analyzes the 
chemical profile of the fertilizer of each in-state manufacturer, as the fertilizer leaves each plant. The crime lab does this because fertilizer 
is sometimes used as an ingredient in terrorist bombs. At the bombing scene, the chemical profile of the fertilizer, and hence its 
manufacturing source, can be ascertained. The government may be able to use this information to identify the ultimate purchaser of the 
fertilizer. The state lab routinely does these analyses and makes these records well before any bombings have occurred. Thus, the state lab 
does not focus on any particular prosecutions or suspects when these records are made, but it can still be said that the lab makes these 
records with a future prosecutorial use in mind. Suppose that eventually a bombing does occur, a defendant is caught, and part of the proof 
proffered against the defendant is that the fertilizer was traced to the defendant through the state crime lab's chemical profile records. 
Accordingly, the state wants to introduce the state crime lab report as part of its evidence. While the report was expressly made for the 
purpose of possible prosecution, arguably it should not be regarded as "testimonial" for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, since no 
motive to implicate any particular person could possibly have affected its making (as it was purely routine and made in a non-adversarial 
setting before any crime occurred or a case arose). Whether there is such a "routine records" or "non-adversarial records" exception to the 
Confrontation Clause--as there is to the ban on law enforcement records in the Public Records hearsay exception under cases such as 
United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976)--is another question the Supreme court is eventually going to have to answer. A 
similar situation would arise where a crime lab is asked to derive a DNA profile from a crime-scene sample supplied by the police, but the 
lab is not informed that the police or prosecution want the profile to yield a particular result, nor is the lab informed of anything about the 
case. In this situation, like the situation discussed above, arguably no adversarial motive would taint the result, despite the fact that the 
analysis is done in connection with a particular crime. However, this situation may be distinguishable from the above situation, because in 
this situation there is always the possibility that the wishes of the police or prosescution may have surreptitiously gotten to the lab and 
influenced the report. This issue could play a role in evaluating the private DNA lab used in the Williams case, which is currently pending 
before the Supreme Court. See People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) (No. 10-8505); supra 
notes 249-60 and accompanying text.  
289. See supra sections II.B-D.  
290. See supra section II.E, Part III.  
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But what if we remove official involvement entirely in making or receiving the statement? For example, what if a 
citizen makes a statement in his home to a friend, that later is offered in evidence against a criminal accused via 
the testimony of the friend? There are suggestions in Crawford, Davis, and Bryant, that both (1) intention (that the 
statement be used in the criminal process) of the person making the statement, and (2) official participation, are 
significant to a holding that the Confrontation Clause applies.291 Both factors were present in those cases which 
involved police questioning and those which involved forensic reports, where the Court found confrontation 
violations.292 
 
But suppose the former (intention) is present, but not the latter (official involvement). For example, in the friend-
to-friend example, suppose the friend making the statement means to incriminate the criminal defendant and 
hopes the statement will get to police and prosecutors.293 The cases do not say whether the Confrontation Clause 
would be violated. If distrust of government--the possibility of government pressure, overreaching, or cheating, in 
the creation of the statement--is behind the confrontation requirement, perhaps this example is not within the 
ambit of the Confrontation Clause. But it is not clear that the Court feels this way. In Davis, the Court had an 
opportunity to address whether state involvement in making or garnering the statement was indispensible to 
finding a statement to be testimonial.294 The statement in Davis was taken from a citizen by a 911 operator.295 
Some 911 operators may be employed by private entities and not by the state. The court could have addressed 
whether that kind of independent status would prevent a finding that the statement was testimonial and therefore 
would avert a confrontation violation. But it did not, because, regardless of that issue, the statement was not 
testimonial, owing to the fact that it was stated in an emergency context.296 The court assumed without deciding 
the issue, that the 911 operator was an agent of the state or the functional equivalent of the state297 but did not say 
whether that would make any difference in some case where it was not an emergency situation. It thus did not 
answer what would be the result if it were not an emergency context (so the statement might be testimonial) and 
the operator was totally independent. 
 
291. See supra sections II.B-D.  
292. See supra sections II.B-D.  
293. If there is no such contemplation by either friend, then neither of the factors present for a confrontation violation are present. The 
clearest case of a nontestimonial statement in this regard would be the following friend-to-friend statement, made in idle conversation: "At 
3:50 p.m. Tuesday I saw Fred Jones at the corner of Main and Sixth Streets." It later develops that, unbeknownst to the friends, at 3:50 p.m. 
on that Tuesday, the bank at Main and Sixth was robbed. The statement is sought to be offered (via the friend to whom the statement was 
made) by the prosecution in the criminal prosecution of Fred Jones for the robbery.  
294. See supra section II.C for an in depth discussion of Davis.  
295. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 818-19 (2006).  
296. Id. at 822.  
297. See supra section II.C.  
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Now suppose that the lab in Bullcoming was a private lab instead of a state lab, in no way under the effective 
control of the state. Would this have removed the “official involvement” factor? It would not, because the 
requesting authority--the people who requested the test and report--were official entities, the police and 
prosecutors. So it would seem that offering the report without the analyst would still be a confrontation violation. 
The statements in the report would still be testimonial. 
 
This result is supported by Justice Scalia's dissent in Bryant.298 He states that even though business records may 
pass muster with regard to the Federal Rules of Evidence, if such records were made even by neutral (non-state) 
scientific parties providing support for litigation, the Confrontation Clause would bite even if the rules of 
evidence would not.299 This result is also supported by the fact that the non-appearing witnesses in the landmark 
Confrontation Clause cases discussed in Part II (Crawford, Davis, Bryant) were private individuals and the 
Confrontation Clause applied with full force.300 
 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has never clearly resolved the issue. The Court in Bullcoming could have 
indicated that a public laboratory, or one under the effective control of the state, is less neutral than a private 
laboratory. If the Court determined that one rationale for finding scientific reports testimonial is that they are non-
neutral accusations, then the Court might have considered drawing a distinction between public laboratories 
(which are presumably less neutral to state prosecutions) and private laboratories (which are presumably more 
neutral to state prosecutions). However, even if such a distinction were drawn, there would also have to be an 
investigation into whether a private entity were under the effective control of the state (for instance if the state's 
patronage made up a sufficiently large percentage of the laboratory's revenue). Although the Court chose not to 
specifically draw a distinction between public and private laboratories in Bullcoming, neither did the Court 
specifically state that no such distinction exists. Thus, even after the Court's opinion, local laboratories continue to 
lack sufficient notice of their position. 
 
 
298. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1174-75 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
299. Id.  
300. Also in support of the result is the Court's tendency to focus on the statement itself and not on who makes the statement. See supra 
subsection IV.A.1.  
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The issue could possibly be addressed when the U.S. Supreme Court reviews the Illinois Supreme Court's 
decision in Williams.301 In Williams one of the two labs involved was one of the country's most renowned private 
laboratories, Cellmark of Maryland.302 The Illinois Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether its 
private status made any difference because in either event the expert witness was allowed to address the lab 
reports as part of her opinion.303 If the U.S. Supreme Court does not agree with this “expert testimony” rationale 
when it decides Williams, the Court may have to address the public-private question. 
 
For the reasons mentioned above in this section, we believe the U.S. Supreme Court will not, and should not, 
draw a distinction between public and private entities. We do not believe that a private entity doing a job for the 
state is significantly more trustworthy, credible, or reliable than a state entity doing the job. The Court should not 
treat a similar statement in a report differently depending on whether the report was compiled by a public or 
private laboratory. 
 
B. Implications of Bullcoming Opinion For Law Enforcement 
 
The nine issues identified above have major consequences for local and federal law enforcement, as well as for 
the use of forensic sciences in criminal trials generally.304 Depending on the Justices' views on constitutional 
interpretation, such practical considerations may be unimportant. However, these practical considerations will be 
extremely important to states, localities, federal agencies, and lower federal courts. 
 
To begin, laboratories may simply be unable to meet the needs imposed by requiring the specific analyst to 
testify. Some laboratories perform thousands of tests in a year.305 Analysts within those laboratories will often 
have many duties such as training, attending to duties in the lab, quality assurance, and administration.306 The  
 
 
301.People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) (No. 10-8505).  
302. Id. at 271.  
303. Id. at 277-82.  
304. The case will likely have reverberations in many forensics areas including autopsies, DNA, toxicology, ballistics, hair and skin 
analysis, and fingerprinting. In his dissenting opinion in Bullcoming, Justice Kennedy was again concerned that the Court's opinion would 
negatively impact law enforcement. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
305. See Brief for the NDAA as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 22, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876) (citing 
statistics that one Ohio County Coroner, with a staff of seven forensics professionals and two Ph.D.'s, performed some 35,000 toxicology 
tests in eight years); see also Brief for the States, supra note 246, at 5-8.  
306. Brief for the States, supra note 246, at 7.  
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specific analyst who compiled the report may very often be unavailable to testify. If admissibility now turns on 
the specific analyst having time to travel to court, wait for her appearance, and testify, great harm could be done 
to prosecutions requiring DNA, toxicology, controlled substances, and other forensic analysis.307 Prosecutions in 
certain state courts will be even more difficult. In some state courts, trials may be postponed, moved forward, or 
plead out at the last second.308 It is impracticable to believe that a single analyst will be able to keep her schedule 
open for months on the chance that any given day will be the day for her testimony.309 Thus, a good deal of 
evidence may necessarily be excluded due to unavailability. 
 
Requiring specific analyst testimony may hinder even routine laboratory support for trials. For instance, the 
prosecution must account for the chain of custody in forensic analysis criminal cases.310 Accounting for chain of 
custody may require representations that an investigative officer obtained the evidence from the scene of the 
crime, that his partner took the evidence to the evidence holding locker, that a third individual ensured that the 
evidence was properly sealed in the holding locker, and so on.311 Should all or most of these individuals be 
required to appear in Court, then even routine chain of custody representations will become quite problematic. 
Although the opinion of the Court in Melendez-Diaz appears to exempt some individuals representing the chain 
of custody,312 the Court's opinion still seems to require the prosecution to support, with live testimony, any 
evidence the prosecution chooses to offer (on objection by the defense).313 Holding that confrontation rights attach 
to certain chain of custody representations may go beyond traditional law in this area314 and discourage 
prosecutorial efficiency.315 
 
 
307. Id. at 7-8.  
308. Id. at 7.  
309. Id. at 7-8.  
310. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2546 (2009).  
311. Id.  
312. See id. at 2561 n.1 ("We do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of 
custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person ... .").  
313. Id.  
314. Justice Kennedy makes this argument in the dissent. See id. at 2546 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
315. If prosecutorial efficiency was severely curtailed, this could impinge upon a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. Amber 
N. Gremillion, I'll Be Seeing You In Court: Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts' Flawed Decision and Its Impact On Louisiana, 37 S.U. L. 
Rev. 255, 273 (2010).  
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Requiring the specific analyst to testify may also harm special forensics functions. For instance, the efficacy of 
DNA data banks may be curtailed.316 DNA data bank programs have been successful at holding DNA and helping 
solve cold cases which are many years old.317 In such cold cases, it is unlikely that the original analysts will be 
available or even alive.318 If the specific analyst must testify, then these data bank programs may lose efficacy.319 
Similarly, federal agency support for local prosecutions may be hindered. For example, a federal agency, such as 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), may provide laboratory support for state prosecutions.320 Such support 
will be of little use if the FBI agent conducting the analysis cannot fly to the state in question to appear for 
testimony. 
 
Requiring the specific analyst to testify may even hinder states from exercising their basic police powers and 
instituting public safety and public policy initiatives. For instance, if a state was attempting to institute a zero-
tolerance policy toward drinking and driving, the state may be unable to police such a policy if the blood alcohol 
analyst had to appear in every trial for DUI or DWI.321 Likewise, requiring specific analyst testimony would 
severely limit the efficacy of drug prosecutions, which are often supported by scientific analysis, and numbered 
25,000 in Philadelphia in 2007 alone.322 One commentator suggests that states may be effectively forced to either 
decriminalize certain activities (which the state would otherwise choose to keep criminal) or plea out many more 
cases (with the state offering very generous plea agreements).323 The result for states may be a loss of effective 
police power and more criminals evading conviction on technicalities.324 
 
 
316. Brief for the States, supra note 246, at 10-11.  
317. Id. at 10.  
318. Id.  
319. Id.  
320. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2550 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
321. This public policy concern is highlighted by the New Mexico Department of Health Laboratory Division. Brief for the New Mexico 
Department of Health Laboratory Division as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 30-31, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 
2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876).  
322. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In Louisiana, there were 17,959 arrests for offenses relating to drugs. 
Gremillion, supra note 315, at 272.  
323. Bradley W. Hines, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: Forcing America To Pay The Premium Price For The Nation's New 
Confrontation Clause, 21 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 123, 147 (2010).  
324. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
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Finally, even if crime laboratories were able to function effectively, requiring the specific analyst to testify may 
create unreasonable financial burdens for the states.325 Analysts at state crime laboratories are paid out of public 
money and if such analysts are spending more time out of the laboratory, then more analysts might need to fill the 
gap created by the frequent court appearances of laboratory personnel.326 Additionally, there will be pecuniary 
costs associated with travel to court and preparation for testimony.327 These costs could be significant and may 
result in greatly increased taxes328 or further harm to state budgets. 
 
Despite these concerns, some knowledgeable sources question whether such severe consequences would result 
from requiring the analyst to testify. Justice Scalia, for instance, doubted that dire consequences would result from 
making the analyst testify.329 He noted that several states had already required analyst testimony and the 
consequences have not been dire.330 The Petitioners in Bullcoming and the Amicus Brief of the Public Defender 
Service in Bullcoming made a similar point.331 States may also take certain actions to mitigate the economic and 
social costs of analyst testimony in criminal prosecutions.332 First, some states have adopted a “subpoena system” 
whereby the confrontation rights of a defendant in forensics cases are satisfied by the defendant's ability to 
subpoena the specific forensic analyst.333 Although the Supreme Court seemed to contend that the subpoena 
ability is not sufficient for confrontation purposes,334 a reversal of that position would certainly mitigate the costs 
on the states. Second, some states have enacted notice-and-demand laws, which require the prosecutor to notify 
the defense of the intention to use a scientific report and allow the defendant a chance to object to the report's use 
unless the reporter appears in court.335 If the defendant does not object, the report is admissible without the  
 
 
325. Hines, supra note 323, at 142-46.  
326. Id.  
327. Id.  
328. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
329. Id. at 2540-42.  
330. Id.  
331.Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 261, at 18; Brief for the Public Defender Service as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5-15, 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876) [hereinafter Brief for the Public Defender Service].  
332.Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 261, at 18-19; Brief for the Public Defender Service, supra note 331, at 7-25.  
333. Hines, supra note 323, at 150-51.  
334. See supra subsection IV.A.6.  
335. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540-42; see also Gremillion, supra note 315, at 282-85 (noting two separate types of Notice and 
Demand statutes).  
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analyst's testimony. These laws are consistent with even a broad right to confront because under the Confrontation 
Clause the defendant has the responsibility to raise an objection on the basis of the Clause.336 These notice-and-
demand laws, then, merely create a time-limited mechanism through which the defendant can invoke (or waive) 
her right to confront the forensic analyst.337 The U.S. Supreme Court seems to have approved such notice and 
demand laws.338 Third, states could employ technology such as “two-way video conferencing . . . .”339 If an 
analyst could ‘testify’ directly through the front-facing camera on his laboratory computer, the analyst would 
expend significantly less time and resources in giving court testimony. Fourth, and finally, there is often the 
possibility of re-testing, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out in a portion of her opinion that did not receive full 
majority subscription.340 If an analyst whose testimony would be required is gone or dead, in many cases the 
substance or material tested will still be available for the state to re-test with an analyst who is available to be 
called to testify. Thus, there is certainly support for the contention that specific analyst testimony is possible 
without impracticable costs to the states and federal government. 
 
Although the severity of harm caused by requiring analyst testimony in forensics cases is debated, it is clear that 
the Court's interpretation of the scope of confrontation rights and guidance as to how to meet the rights of 
defendants has major implications for states, localities, and even the federal government. Given the importance of 
the Court's position, the Court's treatment of law enforcement considerations in its Bullcoming opinion was 
surprisingly minimal. Justice Ginsburg was joined only by Justice Scalia in the portion of her opinion which 
attempted to address law enforcement policy.341 Even Justice Ginsburg's opinion failed to move beyond the 
reassertion of arguments employed previously by the Court342 and bare assertions that the harm would not be 
severe.343 
 
 
336. Hines, supra note 323, at 134. Melendez-Diaz seemed to approve the constitutionality of these laws. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
129 S. Ct. 2527, 2541 (2009).  
337. Hines, supra note 323 at 134.  
338. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541.  
339. Hines, supra note 323 at 154-57.  
340. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2011).  
341. Id. at 2709, 2717-19.  
342. For instance, Justice Ginsburg makes the argument that notice-and-demand statutes can minimize the harm to law enforcement and 
that very few cases actually result in trial proceedings. Id. at 2718.  
343. For instance, Justice Ginsburg suggests that in states which require analyst testimony to support scientific reports, "the sky has not 
fallen." Id. at 2719.  
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In our view, the practical consequences for law enforcement are relevant but not dispositive. Where the 
Constitution is clear in granting criminal defendants the right to cross-examine the specific forensic analyst who 
performed the analysis, then such clear right in our view does and will trump these practical considerations. 
However, we are not persuaded that the Confrontation Clause envisages in all circumstances an absolute right to 
confront the specific analyst or all specific analysts. In unclear circumstances, the practical consequences are 
relevant. Creating an unqualified right to confront the specific analyst in all the situations discussed in this Article 
would too severely curtail law enforcement and the protection to citizens that law enforcement affords. In the final 
Part of this Article, we will present our conclusions. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
While it is true that practical concerns such as the needs of law enforcement cannot trump an individual's clear 
constitutional right to confrontation,344 it is also true that where the constitutional right is not clear, such concerns 
can properly influence filling in the contours of that right, in our view. 
 
We believe that the practical law enforcement concerns discussed above militate in favor of a limited surrogate 
witness and expert witness exception to Melendez-Diaz's and Bullcoming's requirement that the prosecution 
cannot use a forensic report without the specific analyst being presented by the prosecution for testimony. The 
exception should allow a properly qualified surrogate witness or expert witness, who has a sufficiently strong 
foundation or basis, to testify in place of the analyst, at least if the analyst is unavailable. 
 
Bullcoming could have taken the bull by the horns and said whether such exceptions will be recognized and if so, 
what their general parameters are, as it could have with other of the issues discussed herein. This would have been 
desirable from the standpoint of providing much needed guidance to all the participants in the process, but 
perhaps the guidance would have been ill thought out at this early stage of developing jurisprudence on the issue. 
Presumably owing to concerns of this nature, the Court did not take the opportunity. It was not necessary to do so 
on the facts345--there was no way the testifying witness could have met the qualifications of any reasonable 
version of the exceptions. 
 
We are fairly confident, however, that the Court will find it necessary to pronounce on these exceptions in the not-
too-distant future, and that the Justices will recognize some version of one, or both, of these exceptions. 
 
 
344. See supra notes 342-43 and accompanying text.  
345. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.   
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The purpose of this Article was to highlight the issues raised by, and potential consequences of, the applicability 
(or inapplicability) of the Confrontation Clause to forensic scientists creating purportedly objective reports, in 
various situations. Part I introduced the Article. Part II provided the necessary case law history such that the 
issues were placed in their historical contexts. Part III introduced the Bullcoming case. Finally, Part IV first 
identified a number of issues which we believe required clarification prior to the Bullcoming decision, then 
discussed the extent to which the Court adequately clarified and addressed each issue, and finally highlighted the 
importance of these issues in terms of individual rights, forensics and law enforcement policy. 
 
Analysis of the relevant cases and materials led us to believe that the Court will eventually have to more clearly 
instruct participants in the process as to the applicability of the Confrontation Clause to forensic reports like those 
involved in Bullcoming and variations thereof. The Court in Bullcoming could have resisted the impulse to 
answer only the narrow question before it and resolved some of the confusion that surrounds many of the other 
questions in the area of forensic reporting and confrontation rights. The Court could have specifically addressed 
and more fully clarified the issues that we have raised in this Article, which would have provided much needed 
guidance to all involved in the system. On the other hand, there are strong considerations that counsel judicial 
restraint and a gradual exposition of the issues, and these considerations appear to have won out in Bullcoming. 
Nevertheless, we would hope that the Court will clarify the remaining issues in future Confrontation Clause 
opinions as rapidly as possible, consistent with good judging. Although evidence itself--much to the chagrin of 
CSI's Grissom--may not always be explicitly clear, the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of evidence law and 
constitutional rights should be, at least after a decent period of gestation. 
